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Chapter 1 Introduction 
Macroeconomic expectation data are of great interest to different agents due to their 
importance as central input factors in various applications. To name but a few, politicians, 
capital market participants, as well as academics, incorporate these forecast data into their 
decision processes. Consequently, a sound understanding of the quality properties of 
macroeconomic forecast data, their quality determinants, as well as potential ways to improve 
macroeconomic predictions is desirable.   
This thesis consists of three essays on the quality of analysts’ forecasts. The first essay deals 
with macroeconomic forecast quality on the consensus level, while the second one 
investigates individual analysts’ predictions and their quality determinants. In the third essay 
a bottom-up approach is introduced to derive macroeconomic forecasts from analysts’ 
predictions at the microeconomic level.  
It is generally assumed that macroeconomic consensus forecasts provide a reasonable 
approximation of market participants’ expectations regarding upcoming macroeconomic 
releases. Research areas in which these expectation data are a central input to isolate the 
unanticipated news component of a given announcement include studies analyzing the price 
impact of macroeconomic news in bond markets (e.g., Balduzzi et al., 2001; Gilbert et al., 
2010), stock markets (e.g., Boyd et al., 2005; Cenesizoglu, 2011) as well as in foreign 
exchange markets (e.g., Andersen et al., 2003; Evans and Lyons, 2008). Furthermore, these 
forecast data are used to study market co-movement (e.g., Albuquerque and Vega, 2009), 
market volatility (e.g., Beber and Brandt, 2008; Brenner et al., 2009), changes in market 
liquidity (e.g., Brandt and Kavajecz, 2004; Pasquariello and Vega, 2007, 2009) as well as 
bond and equity risk premiums (e.g., Savor and Wilson, 2012; Dicke and Hess, 2012). 
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It appears reasonable to assume that macroeconomic consensus forecasts represent market 
participants’ expectations properly. So far available studies on forecast rationality at the 
consensus level largely test for general quality properties.1 They commonly find no evidence 
of systematic or persistent inefficiencies.2 In contrast to these previous studies, Campbell and 
Sharpe (2009) test for a specific behavioral inefficiency, the anchoring bias, first documented 
by Tversky and Kahneman (1974) in psychological experiments. Transferred to the context of 
macroeconomic forecasts, anchoring means that analysts put too much importance on last 
months’ data and therefore underweight meanwhile released relevant information. This 
behavior implies a false incorporation of all available information into their forecasts. 
Consequently, a correction, i.e., the efficient use of the entire available information set would 
yield forecast improvements. 
Our analysis reveals a counter-intuitive result: We find strong statistical significance for 
anchoring in most macroeconomic forecast series, but applying a look-ahead bias free 
estimation and adjustment procedure leads to no systematic forecast improvements. 
Therefore, our results question the economical significance of the anchoring bias. To provide 
an explanation for the disconnection of statistical and economical significance, we decompose 
the anchoring bias test statistic and find that the test is biased itself. While the test assumes a 
univariate information environment, it neglects the possibility that analysts may provide 
superior forecasts by using a more comprehensive information set than just the univariate time 
series itself. Our empirical as well as our simulation results strongly support this explanation 
for a broad range of macroeconomic series. 
                                                     
1
 See e.g., Pesando (1975), Mullineaux (1978), Pearce and Roley (1985), Aggarwal et al. (1995), and Schirm 
(2003). 
2
 The most recent study, Schirm (2003), only finds for a small number of investigated series some bias. 
However, his results partly contradict the findings of Aggarwal et al. (1995) obtained on a different sample.  
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Our analysis contributes to different strands of literature. First, our results directly add to the 
scarce literature analyzing the efficiency of macroeconomic survey forecasts by showing that 
informational advantages of analysts, i.e., the incorporation of related macroeconomic data, 
enable them to outperform mechanically generated time series forecasts. Furthermore, our 
results provide motivation for other research areas, such as studies analyzing equity analysts’ 
outputs, to control for a larger information set, for instance by including earnings information 
of related companies or information about overall business conditions. Second, our findings 
strongly support the assumption that macroeconomic survey forecasts represent a reasonable 
proxy measure for the anticipated information component in macroeconomic releases and 
consequently justify their use in the above mentioned research areas. Furthermore, our results 
highlight the danger to test for cognitive biases in a time series context which were previously 
only tested in controlled experiments. Especially when experiments are conducted in a highly 
regulated informational setting, i.e., when information given to test participants has to be 
strictly controlled for, as in anchoring bias experiments, it is questionable whether a direct 
transfer in a time series setting is possible at all. Future studies analyzing cognitive biases in 
time series frameworks have to consider carefully whether informational constraints might 
drive the results and lead to false conclusions.   
The first essay provides strong evidence for the quality of macroeconomic forecasts at the 
consensus level, the second essay deals with individual macroeconomic forecasts and 
analyzes why certain analysts provide better forecasts then others. In particular, we focus on 
the association between the idiosyncratic predictability of a given macroeconomic indicator 
and the relation between analyst characteristics and macroeconomic forecast accuracy.  
Obviously, there might be quality differences on the individual analyst level, i.e., there are 
more and less precise macroeconomic analysts. Exploiting these quality differences is a 
desirable task, because academics would obtain better proxy measures for market 
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participants’ expectations, and for investors an information advantage should translate into 
higher profits. We argue that if an indicator’s idiosyncratic predictability is low, i.e., the series 
is almost not predictable, for instance due to information constrains and very volatile 
processes, then analysts’ forecast performance is rather random than systematic because skills 
cannot take effect. In contrast, if a macroeconomic indicator has a high idiosyncratic 
predictability, then analysts with certain characteristics benefit from their abilities and skills, 
and generate more precise forecasts than less skilled analysts. Accordingly, for the 
unpredictable indicators the relation between analyst characteristics and forecast accuracy 
should be less pronounced than for the predictable ones. Consequently, we hypothesize that 
the idiosyncratic predictability of a certain macroeconomic indicator has to be taken into 
account whenever the relation between analyst characteristics and forecast accuracy is 
analyzed. 
So far there is only contradictory evidence concerning differences in individual forecast 
quality of macroeconomic analysts. While some studies provide evidence for different 
forecast quality among individual macroeconomic analysts (e.g. Zarnowitz, 1984; McNees, 
1987; Zarnowitz and Braun, 1993; Kolb and Stekler, 1996; Brown et al., 2008) other articles 
come to the opposite conclusion (e.g. Stekler, 1987; Ashiya, 2006). Despite this disagreement, 
the relation between macroeconomic forecast accuracy differences and analyst characteristics 
has not been analyzed so far, although the extensive strand of literature analyzing the 
association of equity analyst characteristics and earnings per share forecast accuracy (e.g. 
Clement, 1999; Clement and Tse, 2005; Brown and Mohammad, 2010) provides a sound 
framework for an analysis.3 
                                                     
3
 Only Brown et al., 2008 investigate the relation between analysts’ ability and forecast precision. However, their 
study design differs significantly with respect to the set of used variables as well as the employed model 
compared to recent research designs used to analyze the performance of equity analysts.   
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Most importantly, we find that model performance heavily depends on the idiosyncratic 
predictability of macroeconomic indicators. With decreasing idiosyncratic predictability the 
relevance of analyst characteristics for forecast accuracy diminishes for some characteristics 
and disappears for others. In terms of economic significance we find substantial differences 
between macroeconomic indicators with high and low idiosyncratic predictability. 
Consequently, our results show that the idiosyncratic predictability of a given forecast target 
has to be taken into account when the association between analyst characteristics and forecast 
accuracy is analyzed. 
Our findings have implications for different research areas. Most importantly we directly add 
to the literature analyzing individual macroeconomic analysts’ forecast performance. We 
provide evidence that the idiosyncratic predictability of an indicator has to be taken into 
account if the relation between analyst characteristics and forecast accuracy is analyzed. 
Differentiation among analysts is only very limited if the figure to be forecasted is virtually 
unpredictable, because analysts do not benefit from their abilities and experiences. Systematic 
forecast accuracy differences arise if the forecast target is predictable at all and more skilled 
analysts have the opportunity to differentiate themselves form less skilled ones based on 
superior skills. Since there are differences in the predictability of company earnings our 
framework is transferable. Analogous to our findings for macroeconomic analysts, we expect 
that idiosyncratic predictability plays an equally important role analyzing the association 
between equity analysts’ characteristics and their earnings per share forecast performance, 
i.e., for company earnings with higher idiosyncratic predictability we expect higher 
heterogeneity in forecast accuracy which can be explained by analyst characteristics.   
The first two essays provide evidence that macroeconomic predictions are in general of high 
quality as they incorporate rationally information from various sources. Besides the 
previously analyzed macroeconomic forecasts, agents such as politicians and employers, also 
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heavily rely on other information, for example, on coincident and leading macroeconomic 
indicators. Determining the current state of the economy and obtaining sound projections 
about future overall macroeconomic developments plays an important role in their decision 
processes. Coincident and leading macroeconomic indicators incorporate a large set of 
macroeconomic variables as well as stock and bond market measures, e.g., returns and interest 
rate spreads. However, there is no evidence about how expectations at the microeconomic 
level relate to expectations at the macroeconomic level. Consequently, an aggregate of 
microeconomic expectation data, i.e., individual company expectations, are not included in 
coincident and leading macroeconomic indicators so far.  
To overcome this shortcoming we introduce a bottom-up approach that aggregates individual 
company expectations to derive macroeconomic content. Since the development of the entire 
economy is closely related to the development of its individual parts, among them individual 
companies, aggregated company information must contain macroeconomic information. 
Unfortunately, there is no database containing managements’ expectations, however, we use 
equity analysts’ outputs as proxy measure. Equity analysts’ information sets comprise public 
macroeconomic-, industry- and company-specific content as well as non-public company-
specific information (Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980) and is therefore arguably the best available 
proxy for managements’ expectations. Regarding the choice of the best analyst’s output we 
use recommendation changes instead of earnings per share (EPS) changes, because 
recommendations comprise more information. Besides the one year earnings estimate, 
recommendations also contain a series of future earnings expectations as well as interest rate 
and risk premium expectations. We show that aggregated recommendation changes as proxy 
measure for changing company outlooks have predictive power for overall economic 
developments. 
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Our results provide evidence that aggregated recommendation changes, which approximate 
changing expectations about individual companies’ economic prospects, have predictive 
power for future macroeconomic developments of about one year. Controlling for other well 
established macroeconomic predictors our results remain robust indicating that our measure 
contains additional independent information. Consequently, it seems promising to include our 
new predictor into the set of macroeconomic predictors in future applications. Additionally, 
we find that EPS changes have no predictive power lending support to our assumption that 
more forward looking information, as included in recommendation changes, is required if one 
attempts to forecast future macroeconomic developments. Furthermore, our findings provide 
the missing link between previous studies showing that aggregated analyst outputs have 
predictive power for overall stock market developments (Howe et al., 2009) and those 
showing that the stock market leads the real economy (Stock and Watson, 1998). Our results 
support the notion that changes in expectations about future company performance rationally 
determine asset values in advance of overall economic activity changes providing the 
explanation why stock markets lead the real economy. 
Overall, the three essays in this thesis advance different strands of literature. We show that 
macroeconomic consensus forecasts are a reliable proxy measure for market participants’ 
expectations. Furthermore, our results provide strong evidence that it is dangerous to transfer 
psychological experiments into time series frameworks without appropriately controlling the 
informational environment. Additionally, we show that the idiosyncratic predictability of a 
given forecast objective, i.e. whether a forecast task is satisfyingly feasible at all, has to be 
taken into account whenever the association between analyst characteristics and forecast 
accuracy is analyzed. Macroeconomic analysts do only benefit from their superior skills 
compared to their competitors if the macroeconomic series is idiosyncratically predictable. 
For unpredictable series, forecast accuracy is rather random than systematic, because superior 
8 
 
skills do not systematically translate in better forecasts. Finally, we show that the aggregation 
of forecasts on the microeconomic level, i.e., company expectations, is a promising approach 
to extract macroeconomic information. Overall, we conclude that macroeconomic analysts are 
very efficient information processors and play an important role as intermediaries in financial 
markets.   
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Chapter 2 Irrationality or Efficiency of Macroeconomic 
Survey Forecasts? Implications from the Anchoring Bias Test 
2.1 Introduction 
A large and growing body of literature provides evidence that overall economic conditions 
strongly influence financial markets. Surprising macroeconomic data, in particular, 
unanticipated information in scheduled macroeconomic reports, change market participants’ 
perceptions of the fundamental value of assets. As a result, macroeconomic news is shown to 
explain price changes in bond markets (e.g., Balduzzi et al., 2001; Gilbert et al., 2010), stock 
markets (e.g., Boyd et al., 2005; Cenesizoglu, 2011) as well as foreign exchange markets 
(e.g., Andersen et al., 2003; Evans and Lyons, 2008).4 Macroeconomic news helps to explain 
co-movement of markets (e.g., Albuquerque and Vega, 2009), market volatility (e.g., Beber 
and Brandt, 2008; Brenner et al., 2009), changes in market liquidity (e.g., Brandt and 
Kavajecz, 2004; Pasquariello and Vega, 2007, 2009) as well as bond and equity risk 
premiums (e.g., Savor and Wilson, 2012; Dicke and Hess, 2012). As a common theme, all of 
these studies need to isolate the unanticipated information component in macroeconomic 
releases from already expected information. Therefore they rely heavily on macroeconomic 
survey forecasts collected, for example, by Bloomberg or Money Market Services (MMS)5, 
                                                     
4
 Stock prices, for example, are largely affected by macroeconomic risk through three channels (e.g., Boyd et al., 
2005), i.e., risk-free rates (e.g., Balduzzi et al., 2001), risk premiums (e.g., De Goeij et al., 2009; Bestelmeyer et 
al., 2012) and earnings expectations (e.g., Agarwal and Hess, 2012). 
5
 Most frequently MMS survey data are used, for example, by Urich and Wachtel (1984), McQueen and Roley 
(1993), Almeida et al. (1998), Elton (1999), Balduzzi et al. (2001), Flannery and Protopapadakis (2002), 
Andersen et al. (2003), Green (2004), Bernanke and Kuttner (2005), Gürkaynak et al. (2005), Hautsch and Hess 
(2007), Evans and Lyons (2008), and Hautsch et al. (2012). 
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assuming that survey forecasts provide a reasonable approximation of market participants’ 
expectations.   
In contrast, Campbell and Sharpe (2009) recently suggest that there is a substantial 
“anchoring bias” in macroeconomic survey forecasts. But then these survey forecasts do not 
adequately approximate market participants’ expectations as they can be easily improved. 
However, we cannot find improvements in forecast quality once we apply a look-ahead bias 
free test and adjustment procedure. Compared to the extensive research that has been 
conducted in the area of macroeconomic information processing in financial markets (e.g., 
Urich and Wachtel, 1984; McQueen and Roley, 1993; Andersen et al., 2003; Beber and 
Brandt, 2010; Gilbert, 2011) comparatively little analysis is available concerning the 
properties of macroeconomic survey forecasts. This fact is somewhat surprising, but possibly 
due to the high quality of survey forecasts. The few thus far available forecast rationality 
studies largely test for general quality properties derived from the rational expectations 
hypothesis of Muth (1961).6 As a common outcome, general forecast rationality studies 
provide no evidence of systematic or persistent inefficiencies.7 In contrast, Campbell and 
Sharpe (2009) test for a specific behavioral inefficiency, the anchoring bias, first documented 
by Tversky and Kahneman (1974) in psychological experiments. Anchoring implies that too 
much weight is attached to a certain prior available piece of information, the anchor, in the 
decision process. In the context of macroeconomic forecasts it means that analysts put too 
much importance on last months’ data and therefore underweight meanwhile released 
important information. Thus the entire information set available at the survey date is not 
                                                     
6
 See e.g., Pesando (1975), Mullineaux (1978), Pearce and Roley (1985), Aggarwal et al. (1995), and Schirm 
(2003). 
7
 The most recent study, Schirm (2003), only finds for a small number of investigated series some bias. 
However, his results partly contradict the findings of Aggarwal et al. (1995) obtained on a different sample.  
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efficiently incorporated into their forecasts. But then, correcting the analysts’ mistake and 
utilizing the entire available information appropriately must yield improved forecasts.  
However, we cannot reach this conclusion. In contrast, our analysis reveals a counter-intuitive 
result: despite a seemingly strong and statistically significant anchoring bias in most 
macroeconomic survey series, adjusting forecasts for the seemingly apparent bias leads to no 
systematic forecast improvements. Decomposing the anchoring bias test statistic provides an 
explanation for this puzzling result: the test itself is biased. Testing solely against a limited 
information set the anchoring bias test neglects the possibility that analysts may provide 
superior forecasts by using a more comprehensive information set than just the univariate time 
series itself. Our empirical results strongly support this explanation for a broad range of 
macroeconomic series.  
Our analysis points out a universal risk inherent in behavioral tests using time series data: a 
test may detect a bias because rational agents’ forecasts are based on a more comprehensive 
information set than the bias test controls for. In psychological studies,8 the origin of the 
anchoring hypothesis, the available information set plays a central role. Participants usually 
have limited prior information about the figure they have to estimate, e.g., when students are 
asked to give an estimate for the price of a bottle of wine without knowing its quality. In 
contrast, professional forecasters are not confronted with a black box. Most likely, they have a 
much better understanding of the content of macroeconomic indicators and thus provide much 
more sound projections. Discrepancies between the information environment in which the 
forecast was generated and the information the bias test controls for may lead to false 
conclusions.  
                                                     
8
 See for instance Tversky and Kahneman (1974) and Ariely et al. (2003). 
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Our analysis proceeds in five steps. First, we replicate the anchoring bias test of Campbell and 
Sharpe (2009). However, we use a larger set of macroeconomic indicators, allowing for a 
more comprehensive analysis. More importantly, we use a much longer sample period in 
order to facilitate out-of-sample tests. This “dynamic” analysis, i.e., testing on a rolling-
window and correspondingly adjusting forecasts out-of-sample, enables us to model the exact 
information flow as we consider only information available to market participants at a given 
point in time. Hence, our procedure avoids a look-ahead bias. This distinction is important 
because Croushore and Stark (2001), for example, show that different vintages of data can 
lead to different forecasting results. Even more important, in our analysis the available 
information set is of particular importance when we adjust the forecasts for the anchoring 
bias, because only a real-time proceeding ensures a realistic comparison of unadjusted and 
adjusted data. In contrast, Campbell and Sharpe’s analysis (which we call “static”) is based on 
a single in-sample regression. Therefore, a corresponding adjustment incorporates a 
potentially severe look-ahead bias.  
If the highly significant anchoring coefficients would stem from a systematic cognitive bias, 
then adjusting the original survey forecasts must yield substantial improvements in forecast 
quality. Therefore, in a second step, we analyze whether bias adjustments actually improve 
survey forecasts. Surprisingly, despite highly significant anchoring coefficients, we can hardly 
find any significant improvements in forecast quality when adjusting for this seemingly 
apparent bias. Only when we allow for a look-ahead bias, i.e., when we apply the static 
estimation and adjustment, we find some modest improvements. In contrast, if we do not 
allow for a look-ahead bias, we can hardly find any statistically significant improvements. 
Overall, we have to conclude that nothing is gained by adjusting the original survey forecasts 
for anchoring.  
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In order to explain this puzzling result and to provide a basis for our subsequent empirical 
analysis we inspect the mechanics of the anchoring bias test analytically in an intermediate 
step. Most importantly, the anchoring bias test implicitly assumes a univariate time series 
framework. This creates a substantial problem since the test neglects other information which 
most likely alters rational forecasts. In particular, we show that the overall test statistic can be 
decomposed into two components: The first component captures inefficient processing of 
univariate time series information, possibly due to anchoring. The second component, 
however, captures superior information processing abilities of analysts, supposedly due to 
using a richer information set. Hence, large and significant anchoring coefficients cannot only 
arise when analysts face a cognitive bias but also when they correctly incorporate additional 
information into their predictions and therefore outperform time series forecasts. This finding 
provides a first indication that neglecting other information may be responsible for the 
misleading anchoring bias test results. 
Outperforming optimal univariate time series forecasts implies that analysts have to use some 
additional information while generating their forecasts. In fact, in the third step of our 
empirical analysis, we provide evidence supporting the view that macroeconomic analysts 
utilize a more comprehensive information set. In particular, we find that a substantial part of 
the forecast improvements analysts achieve over time series models can be explained by other 
macroeconomic data. This finding suggests that analysts draw on several other 
macroeconomic indicators, in particular, on those macroeconomic figures that are usually 
found to have the strongest impact on prices of financial assets, because they are released 
early and have substantial information content (e.g., Gilbert et al., 2010).  
In a fourth step we perform a simulation to better understand whether the inclusion of 
additional information may affect the anchoring test. The main idea is that there are several 
macroeconomic reports which provide correlated information, but are released successively. 
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Consequently, analysts can draw on more than just univariate time series information when 
they generate their forecasts. As expected, we obtain insignificant anchoring test results for 
the simulated forecast when these are generated utilizing only univariate time series 
information. In contrast, we get highly significant anchoring bias test results for the forecasts 
based on a more comprehensive information set. This clearly indicates that the anchoring test 
is very sensitive to additional information, for example, picked up by analysts through 
observing related releases. Our simulation is specific as it assumes a certain process 
environment, in particular, we assume that macroeconomic data series follow ARIMA 
processes. While this is a commonly used assumption, we cannot rule out that the test may 
work better in other environments. Nevertheless, our simulation clearly shows that the test can 
produce biased results, in particular, if we allow (mechanically generated) forecasts to draw 
on additional information besides the historical univariate time series. 
Finally, in the fifth step, we quantify the relative contributions of the “inefficiency” and the 
“additional information” component to the overall anchoring bias test coefficient. We find 
that for the majority of seemingly biased forecast series, the “additional information” 
component accounts for more than half of the size of the overall anchoring bias test 
coefficient. In line with the findings in the previous steps, this again indicates that the 
additional information component is responsible for creating a substantial bias in the 
anchoring bias test statistic.  
Overall, our analysis clearly shows that the highly significant anchoring bias results are due to 
deficiencies of the test. Focusing exclusively on a limited information set, the anchoring test 
can produce strongly misleading results if analysts process additional information beyond the 
univariate time series data. More generally, our analysis suggests that testing for a specific 
bias such as anchoring by focusing exclusively on univariate time series properties is 
dangerous since it neglects the ability of agents to aggregate additional information. In 
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summary, our findings show that anchoring does not constitute any problem for studies 
building on survey forecasts, most importantly, because bias adjustments do not result in 
superior forecasts. Nevertheless, rejecting the validity of the anchoring test does not provide 
evidence that analysts are processing available information fully rationally. 
Our study contributes to different strands of literature. First, our results directly add to the 
scarce literature analyzing the (in)efficiency of macroeconomic survey forecasts by showing 
that and explaining why analysts easily outperform mechanically generated time series 
forecasts. We find that the superiority of survey forecasts is largely attributable to the 
incorporation of related macroeconomic data. Second, our findings have important 
implications for a broad range of studies analyzing the impact of macroeconomic data as our 
results strongly support their assumption that macroeconomic survey forecasts provide 
unbiased estimates of the anticipated information components in macroeconomic releases 
(e.g., Albuquerque and Vega, 2009; Beber and Brandt, 2010; Gilbert, 2011). Furthermore, 
since the anchoring bias adjusted forecast is basically a weighted combination of the survey 
forecast and an autoregressive model we contribute to the area of forecast combination in 
which currently no results concerning monthly macroeconomic survey forecasts are available. 
The remainder of the study is organized as follows. Section 2.2 briefly delineates the 
anchoring bias test and introduces our framework for the evaluation of analysts’ forecasts. 
Section 2.3 describes the data and their properties. Section 2.4 provides the empirical results 
and section 2.5 concludes.  
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2.2 Methodology 
The basic assumption of the anchoring bias test suggested by Campbell and Sharpe (2009) is 
that a survey forecast ttF τ−
 
for the actual released figure tA  in period t generated in t–τ is a 
linear combination of the two components t tE A I τ−  
 
and 
h
A . t tE A I τ−
 
   denotes the 
unbiased forecast conditional on the information set 
tI τ−  which is available on the day the 
forecast was generated. 
h
A  denotes an average of already released values for the h  previous 
months. Hence, the survey forecast can be written as: 
 ( )1 ,tt t t hF E A I Aτ τλ λ− − = ⋅ + − ⋅   (2.1) 
where λ
 
denotes the weight given to the unbiased forecast which already incorporates all 
available information efficiently. The inclusion of additional past information is redundant 
and therefore λ  should be equal to one. A value of λ  significantly smaller than one would 
suggest anchoring, i.e., that forecasters put too much weight on previously released values in 
comparison to an unbiased estimator. 
Since the unbiased estimator is unobservable a direct estimation of Equation (2.1) is not 
feasible. Nevertheless, an indirect estimation of λ  is possible by means of Equation (2.2) (see 
Appendix 2 A for a derivation):  
 ( ) ( )
1
, with .tt t thS F Aτ
λ
γ η γ
λ
−
−
= ⋅ − + ≡
 (2.2) 
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tS denotes the unanticipated news component defined as actual released figure minus forecast 
and 
tη
 
the error term.9 0γ >  would indicate anchoring, as it implies that 1λ < . We use 
Equation (2.2) to test for anchoring in the first step of our analysis. Equation (2.1) suggests 
that the unbiased forecast t tE A I τ−  
 
is compounded of the survey based forecast and the 
anchor. This can be rewritten as: 
 
( )
( )
1
1
t
tt
t t th h
F
E A I A F Aττ τ
λ
γ γ
λ λ
−
− −
−
  = − ⋅ = + ⋅ − ⋅   . (2.3) 
By means of Equation (2.3) and correspondingly estimated γ  the original forecast data can be 
adjusted for the bias induced by anchoring. These adjusted forecasts serve as input for our 
forecast quality comparison tests in step 2 of our empirical analysis. We apply the Diebold 
and Mariano (1995) test on differences in mean squared forecast errors for two different bias 
adjusted forecasts. First, to evaluate the in-sample impact of the anchoring bias we estimate 
Equation (2.2) over the entire sample period and then adjust the forecasts retrospectively. 
Second, to avoid an in-sample look-ahead bias, we perform a dynamic adjustment by means 
of a rolling estimation of Equation (2.2), i.e., to adjust the next forecast for t we take the 
estimated anchoring bias coefficient using information up to t–1. This dynamic out-of-sample 
adjustment represents an implementable strategy which market participants could adopt in 
real time, and thus, is preferable over the static in-sample adjustment.  
Astonishingly, we find virtually no forecast improvements despite highly significant 
anchoring coefficients. To better understand this result we decompose the anchoring test 
coefficient analytically. The data generating process can well be described by a linear model 
                                                     
9
 Although Equation (2.2) does not include a constant we always include one in the estimation. 
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and therefore we use an ARIMA model to generate time series forecasts.10 Accordingly, we 
assume that tA  follows some ARIMA(p,d,q) process. Moreover, we suppose that analysts 
also use a corresponding ARIMA(p,d,q) model to generate their forecasts, but do not restrict 
themselves to looking at the historical time series of a single indicator. Instead we suppose 
that they possess some additional information tZ  which may be useful to predict the 
innovation εt in ,tA  e.g., from inspecting other macroeconomic announcements or simply 
from reading the daily press. Based on these considerations we show that γˆ  in Equation (2.2) 
can be written as (see Appendix 2 B): 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
' '
1 1
'
1
, ,
ˆ .
t t t t t
t t
Cov y x Cov Z Var Z
Var x Var Z
ε
γ
− −
−
+ −
=
+
 (2.4) 
To separate the part of γˆ  driven by the additional information set measured by 
tZ  we 
decompose γˆ  into two parts (see Appendix 2 B): 
 
( )
( ) ( )
t t
t t
Cov y x
Var x Var Z
' '
1 1
1 '
1
,
γˆ
− −
−
=
+
 (2.5) 
                                                     
10
 Though previous studies detect nonlinearities in macroeconomic time series, there is strong evidence that 
simple linear forecasting models have a superior forecasting performance compared to sophisticated nonlinear 
models, such as self-exciting threshold autoregressive models (SETAR), markov-switching autoregressive 
models, or artificial neural networks (ANN) (e.g., Stock and Watson, 1999; Swanson and White, 1997). 
Furthermore, based on a Monte Carlo study Clements and Krolzig (1998) show that even if the data generating 
process is nonlinear, linear models provide robust forecasts. In fact, most recent studies (e.g., Marcellino, 2008) 
provide strong evidence that linear prediction models can hardly be beaten by more sophisticated nonlinear ones. 
Consequently, we follow Stock and Watson (1999): “If, however, a macroeconomic forecaster is restricted to 
using a single method, then, for the family of loss functions considered here [including MSE], he or she would 
be well advised to use an autoregression with a unit root pretest and data-dependent lag length selection.” 
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and 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )2 ' 1
,
ˆ t t t
t t
Cov Z Var Z
Var x Var Z
ε
γ
−
−
=
+
 (2.6) 
with11  
( )' 1
1
'
1
1 1 1 1
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j
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β β ε
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∞ − ∞
− − − − −
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  ≡ ⋅ + + ⋅    
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∑ ∑∑ ∑
 
The first component 1γˆ
 
captures inefficiencies in analysts’ forecasts while the second 
component 2γˆ
 
captures advantages from processing additional information. Clearly, 1ˆ 0γ =
 
if ( )' '1 1,t tCov y x− − = 0, i.e., if analysts’ estimates ˆjβ  are unbiased and ˆj j jβ β= ∀  holds. 
Then ' 1 0ty − = , i.e., analysts use unbiased coefficient estimates.  
On the other hand, if analysts have superior forecasting abilities compared to the optimal time 
series model, 
tZ  and tε  should be positively correlated. Consequently, 
( ) ( ),t t tCov Z Var Zε >  suggests that some part of the anchoring coefficient γˆ  is driven by 
the additional information utilized by analysts.  
In the third step of our analysis we evaluate whether our assumption that analysts use a more 
comprehensive information set is realistic. Since additional information, ,tZ  is not directly 
observable we have to use a proxy measure for our empirical analysis. The basic idea is to 
produce an optimal univariate time series forecast and to compare this to our MMS survey 
                                                     
11
 Note that the definition of ' 1tx − and 
'
1ty −  differ if tA does not follow an integrated process (see Appendix 2 
B for details). 
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forecast. The difference of these two forecasts must stem from the use of additional 
information. To estimate an optimal ARIMA model for the actual announcement
tA , we first 
run a Phillips-Perron test to determine whether the considered series is stationary and 
difference the series if necessary. Then we estimate the corresponding ARMA models for all 
combinations of p = 0, …, 6 and q = 0, 1 using a rolling window:  
 
0 0
.
p q
t i t i j t j t
i j
A Aα β ε ε− −
= =
= ⋅ − ⋅ +∑ ∑  (2.7) 
Among these we select every period the best fitting model according to Bayes’ information 
criterion (BIC), excluding models with serially correlated residuals. Based on this selection 
procedure, we obtain a dynamic “optimal” time series forecast for .tA  The estimated 
residuals of this model serve as proxy measure for the innovations 
tε , i.e., the component in 
tA which is not predictable from historical univariate time series information. To approximate 
tZ  we apply a corresponding distributed lag model to the survey forecasts tF , i.e., we regress 
the (differenced) forecasts 
tF  on p lags of (differenced) tA  and q lags of tˆε :12
 
 
0 0
ˆ .
p q
t i t i j t j t
i j
F A Zδ θ ε− −
= =
= ⋅ − ⋅ +∑ ∑  (2.8) 
The residuals of this estimation, 
tZ , i.e., the component in survey forecasts tF
 
which cannot 
be traced back to past observed actuals, serve as approximation for
 
the additional information 
component. To rule out the possibility that our proxy for additional information just picks up 
noise and to answer the question where analysts’ outperformance stems from, we analyze how
 
                                                     
12
 Although Equation (2.8) suggests the existence of a generated regressor problem ( tˆ jε − ) we do not control for 
it since we are only interested in the values for 
tZ which would not be altered using an adjusted inference.  
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tZ  is related to information available at the time when analysts produce their forecasts. For 
this purpose we estimate the following model: 
 ,t t tZ Mα β ϕ= + +  (2.9) 
where tZ  denotes the approximated additional information component in survey forecasts. 
tM is a vector which contains the available macroeconomic information set for the 23 
considered indicators seven days prior to an announcement and tϕ denotes the error term. We 
use a stepwise regression approach to determine whether tZ  is related to other 
macroeconomic news.13 Our results suggest that the additional information component is 
highly correlated with previously released macroeconomic indicators. This supports our 
hypothesis that analysts use more than just univariate time series information. 
In step four, we perform a simulation to obtain further evidence whether additional 
information can influence the anchoring bias test results. We exclude parameter instability, 
model uncertainty and look-ahead advantages. Most importantly, our simulation accounts for 
the fact that macroeconomic data for a given reporting month are released successively while 
the released data are contemporaneously correlated (see Appendix 2 C for technical details). 
First, we simulate correlated normally distributed random variables for εt and for Zt. With a 
higher correlation of εt
 
and Zt, Zt should become more useful to predict εt. Using εt we 
generate a time series of actuals, At. Once we have the simulated time series At
 
and Zt, we 
estimate corresponding models on a rolling estimation window and produce one-step-ahead 
                                                     
13
 Since 
tZ
 
is based on estimates and used as dependent variable in the second step regression conventional 
inference is invalid. To control for the resulting generated regressand problem we follow the approach of 
Dumont et al. (2005) and adjust the coefficient covariance matrix, respectively. 
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out-of-sample predictions.14 We produce two types of forecasts: a “simple” one, i.e., one 
exploiting only information in past At, and a “sophisticated” one, i.e., one exploiting Zt in 
addition to
 
At. Finally, we perform anchoring tests on both forecasts. Since both types of 
forecasts are mechanically generated the anchoring test should not be able to detect 
deficiencies. We find that the anchoring test produces insignificant results for the simple 
forecasts but significant results for the sophisticated ones. Since the simple and sophisticated 
forecasts differ only with respect to the information sets they utilize, our simulation clearly 
shows that the test can produce misleading results if analysts exploit additional information.  
Finally, in step five, we quantify the contribution of the “additional information” and the 
“inefficiency” component to the overall anchoring bias coefficient. Based on our theoretical 
considerations including Equation (2.5) and (2.6) a partition is feasible and we can conclude 
whether irrationality or information efficiency drives the anchoring bias test results. For most 
series the additional information component accounts for a substantial proportion of the 
overall anchoring bias test coefficient which clearly contradicts the purpose of the anchoring 
bias test.  
2.3 Data Description 
We use a comprehensive data set comprising 23 well known macroeconomic indicators. Table 
2.1 lists the series along with the abbreviations used in the following sections, their 
availability during the sample periods and the respective reporting unit. Medians of analysts’ 
forecasts for these macroeconomic data are obtained from MMS and Action Economists.15 
                                                     
14
 Note that we abstract from model uncertainty since we use the same p, d and q as for the simulated series. 
15
 Each Friday, MMS polls analysts’ forecasts of macroeconomic figures to be released during the following 
week. Survey responses are received over a three- to four-hour period every Friday morning via fax or phone. 
The results of the survey are published at around 1:30 PM EST. In September 2003 MMS was acquired by 
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Whenever available, we use ALFRED vintage data to measure actual announced values.16 
Otherwise announced values provided by the survey agencies are used.  
Table 2.2 shows sample means ( )µ  and standard deviations ( )σ  for the 23 considered 
indicators (actuals, forecasts, and surprises). Sample means of the surprises are close to zero 
for most indicators implying that the forecasts are unbiased if not conditioned on a specific 
information set. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Informa. However, the original MMS survey was conducted until mid of December 2003. For the time after 
December 2003 we use forecasts provided by Action Economics (AE) because many of the former MMS 
employees responsible for the survey went to AE after MMS was taken over.  
16
 The Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis provides access to a broad set of US macroeconomic data in their 
online database called ArchivaL Federal Reserve Economic Data (ALFRED).  
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Table 2.1 Indicator Overview  
This table reports the used indicators, the abbreviations used throughout the manuscript, the sampling period, and the corresponding unit. 
 
 
 
 Sample Period  
 
Indicator  Abbreviation  Start End  Unit 
Consumer Confidence  CC  07/1991 12/2009  Level 
ISM (formerly NAPM)  ISM  01/1990 11/2009  Level 
Nonfarm Payrolls  NF  01/1985 11/2009  Change (Thousands) 
Civilian Unemployment Rate  UN  01/1980 11/2009  Level 
Hourly Earnings  HE  10/1989 11/2009  % change 
Producer Price Index  PPI  01/1980 11/2009  % change 
Producer Price Index ex Food & Energy  PPI ex  07/1989 11/2009  % change 
Retail Sales  RS  01/1980 11/2009  % change 
Retail Sales ex autos  RS ex  07/1989 11/2009  % change 
Consumer Price Index  CPI  01/1980 11/2009  % change 
Consumer Price Index ex Food & Energy   CPI ex  07/1989 11/2009  % change 
Industrial Production  IP  01/1980 11/2009  % change 
Capacity Utilization  CU  03/1988 11/2009  Level 
Housing Starts  HS  01/1980 11/2009  Level (Millions of Units) 
Durable Goods Orders  DGO  01/1980 11/2009  % change 
New Home Sales  NHS  02/1988 11/2009  Level (Thousands of Units) 
Personal Income  PI  01/1980 11/2009  % change 
Personal Consumption Expenditures  PCE  06/1985 11/2009  % change 
Index of Leading Indicators  LI  01/1980 11/2009  % change 
Construction Spending  CS  02/1988 10/2009  % change 
Factory Orders  FO  02/1988 10/2009  % change 
Business Inventories  BI  02/1988 10/2009  % change 
Goods and Service Trade Balance  TRD  01/1980 10/2009  Level ($ Billions) 
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Table 2.2 Summary Statistics  
This table reports the means (µ ) and standard deviations (σ ) of the actual announced value (Actual), the MMS forecast (Forecast), and the 
resulting surprise calculated as the difference of Actual and Forecast. 
        Actual   Forecast   Surprise 
Indicator N  µ  σ
 
µ  σ
 
µ  σ
 
CC  222  95.595 27.533 95.476 26.779 0.119 5.212 
ISM  239  51.579 5.622 51.630 5.418 -0.051 2.022 
NF  299  106.080 200.982 115.080 157.507 -8.783 109.935 
UN  359  6.150 1.514 6.188 1.518 -0.019 0.164 
HE  240  0.273 0.205 0.261 0.064 0.011 0.195 
PPI  359  0.219 0.653 0.258 0.382 -0.039 0.399 
PPI ex  245  0.135 0.282 0.161 0.091 -0.026 0.265 
RS  359  0.305 1.136 0.324 0.749 -0.032 0.734 
RS ex  245  0.286 0.592 0.319 0.295 -0.033 0.445 
CPI  358  0.291 0.319 0.299 0.258 -0.010 0.151 
CPI ex  244  0.225 0.133 0.223 0.062 0.001 0.116 
IP  359  0.118 0.687 0.129 0.495 -0.010 0.331 
CU  261  80.203 3.586 80.190 3.579 0.006 0.370 
HS  359  1.473 0.349 1.461 0.338 0.012 0.098 
DGO  357  0.211 3.592 0.191 1.367 0.083 2.979 
NHS  261  799.123 244.938 792.236 234.279 6.887 61.263 
PI  358  0.456 0.443 0.407 0.304 0.051 0.304 
PCE  292  0.413 0.499 0.377 0.385 0.033 0.227 
LI  359  0.150 0.764 0.141 0.602 0.009 0.321 
CS  260  0.218 1.072 0.113 0.568 0.105 1.003 
FO  261  0.254 2.194 0.225 1.935 0.030 0.767 
BI  261  0.221 0.458 0.189 0.342 0.032 0.239 
TRD   358   -21.695 19.241   -21.524 19.291  -0.170 2.272 
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2.4 Empirical Results 
Our empirical analysis proceeds in five steps. First, we perform both in- and out-of-sample 
anchoring tests for the 23 macroeconomic series. Given the bias estimates, we analyze in a 
second step whether analysts’ forecasts can be improved by adjustments for anchoring. Third, 
we evaluate analysts’ forecasting abilities in comparison to optimally selected univariate time 
series models and analyze which additional information is contained in analysts’ forecasts. 
Fourth, we present corresponding simulation results. Finally, we decompose estimated 
anchoring coefficients into an “inefficiency” and an “additional information” component
 
and 
evaluate their relative contributions. 
2.4.1 Anchoring Test Results 
We start with a “static” or in-sample test design and estimate Equation (2.2) on the full 
sample for three different specifications of h , where =1h  corresponds to anchoring on the 
last month’s actual only and =h 2
 
or 3 to anchoring on the mean of the two or three 
previously announced actual values, respectively. Since the static test involves a serious look-
ahead-bias we perform a “dynamic” analysis in addition, estimating the anchoring coefficients 
on a rolling window with a fixed length of 10 years.  
Table 2.3 reports results for the static as well as for the dynamic test. Regarding the static 
tests, we report the optimal h , i.e., which regression specification performed best according 
to the Bayes’ information criterion (BIC), along with the corresponding anchoring bias 
coefficient γˆ . These results suggest that in about two thirds of the cases analysts use an 
average and not a single value as anchor. According to the test results survey forecasts for 18 
out of the 23 macroeconomic series are substantially and significantly biased. However, for 
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two of these series we obtain significantly negative coefficients which can hardly be 
explained by anchoring. Moreover, the large variation in the estimated coefficients suggests 
substantially different degrees of anchoring. For factory orders (FO), for example, 0.04γ =  
implies that analysts put about 4% weight on last month’s release and about 96% on the 
 
Table 2.3 Anchoring Bias Test Results 
This table reports results of anchoring bias estimates according to  
( )t t thS F Aγ η= ⋅ − + , 
where 
tS  denotes surprises, i.e., actual value ( tA ) minus MMS forecast ( tF ), and hA
 
is the 
h
 
month anchor (i.e., the mean of the h  previously released actuals). The first two columns 
report the optimal h
 
and estimated γˆ
 
for a test performed on the full sample. Columns (3) to 
(5) report the results for rolling window regressions with a fixed length of 10 years. Inference 
is based on White Standard Errors. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
level, respectively. 
    Static estimates  Dynamic estimates 
  
  
 
most frequent mean std.dev. 
Indicator  h
 
γˆ
 
 h
 
γˆ
 
γˆ
 
CC 1  0.940***    1 0.922 0.365 
ISM 1  0.297** 2 0.225 0.284 
NF 2 0.070 3 0.137 0.271 
UN 2 0.054 1 -0.187 0.284 
HE 2  0.516*** 2 0.439 0.264 
PPI 3  0.315*** 3 0.303 0.146 
PPI ex 1  0.205** 2 0.176 0.262 
RS 1  0.166*** 1 0.183 0.114 
RS ex 1  0.275*** 1 0.382 0.217 
CPI 3  0.150*** 3 0.130 0.127 
CPI ex 1 -0.214** 1 -0.149 0.175 
IP 3  0.256*** 2 0.204 0.173 
CU 1  0.319*** 1 0.268 0.122 
HS 1  0.281** 1 0.339 0.153 
DGO 3  0.398*** 2 0.350 0.103 
NHS 3 -0.104 1 0.557 0.228 
PI 2 0.094 3 0.153 0.115 
PCE 2  0.189*** 2 0.250 0.098 
LI 3  0.174*** 3 0.150 0.107 
CS 3 -0.222*** 1 -0.247 0.087 
FO 3  0.040** 1 0.036 0.033 
BI 3  0.197*** 2 0.260 0.108 
TRD   3 -0.014  1 0.267 0.210 
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unbiased forecast. In contrast, for consumer confidence (CC) it seems that the unbiased 
estimator and the previously released actual enter the MMS forecast with approximately equal 
weights. 
Results of the dynamic anchoring tests are given in Table 2.3 as well. For simplicity we only 
report the most frequently observed optimal h  along with means and the standard deviations 
of the sγˆ  estimated on rolling windows of 10 years length. For most macroeconomic series 
the mean dynamic sγˆ
 
are largely comparable to their static γˆ
 
counterparts, in particular, for 
the series which exhibit a significant static .γˆ  Note that the standard deviations of the 
dynamic γ  estimates are rather large and indicate a substantial variation over the sample. For 
instance, for CC we obtain a mean of 0.922 and a standard deviation of 0.365, stemming from 
a range of dynamic sγˆ  of -0.306 to 1.434 (unreported).  
Although the dynamic test results appear to be slightly weaker, overall they are akin to the 
static test outcomes. For both, static and dynamic tests, we get sizable γˆ
 
coefficients for most 
of the macroeconomic forecast series indicating substantial anchoring. At first glance this 
suggests partly predictable surprises and portends a poor quality of the frequently used survey 
forecasts. Consequently, this finding questions their appropriateness as proxy measures for 
market participants’ expectations. 
2.4.2 Can Anchoring Adjustments Improve Analysts‘ Forecasts? 
Given the highly significant and sizable anchoring coefficients we would expect that analysts’ 
forecasts can be substantially improved by adjusting them according to Equation (2.3). 
Results are given in Table 2.4. First, we compute in-sample adjustments applying the 
estimated static γˆ
 
coefficients. Then, to evaluate the economic impact, we apply the dynamic 
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adjustment. For both static and dynamic adjustments we report the change in root mean 
squared forecast errors (∆ RMSFE) resulting from these adjustments. Negative values 
indicate that the RMSFE of the adjusted MMS forecast is smaller than the unadjusted one, 
i.e., that the anchoring bias adjustment improves forecasts. To test whether these  
 
Table 2.4 Impact of Anchoring Adjustments on Forecast Quality  
This table reports adjusted survey forecasts according to the estimated anchoring bias 
( )ˆ ˆ1adjt t t t hE A I F F Aτ γ γ−  = = + ⋅ − ⋅  , 
where 
tF  denotes MMS forecast ( tF ) and hA
 
is the h
 
months anchor (i.e., the mean of the 
h
 previously released actuals). For convenience, column (1) redisplays static estimates of γˆ . 
Columns (2)-(5) report the results of a Diebold-Mariano (DM) test with small sample 
adjustment for the equality of mean squared errors (MSE). H0: MSE of tF adj = MSE of tF . 
Inference of γˆ
 
is based on White standard errors. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 
5% and 1% level, respectively. 
        Static adjustment x Dynamic adjustment 
Indicator  
 
Static γˆ  
 
∆ RMSFE  DM 
 
∆ RMSFE  DM 
CC   0.940*** -8.38% 3.0611*** -7.94%   2.3913** 
ISM   0.297**  -1.14% 1.1600 3.36% -1.4817 
NF 0.070 -0.15% 0.3318 3.47%  -2.0611** 
UN 0.054 -0.36% 1.0481 1.06% -1.1930 
HE   0.516*** -6.09% 1.9677*   -2.11% 0.3788 
PPI   0.315*** -6.81% 2.2901**  -4.63% 1.5963 
PPI ex   0.205** -2.44% 1.0270 -1.98% 0.7873 
RS   0.166*** -5.73% 2.2316**  15.41% -0.9479 
RS ex   0.275*** -6.39% 2.2695**  -7.87% 1.5492 
CPI   0.150*** -2.58% 1.7648*   -2.21% 1.0900 
CPI ex -0.214** -2.42% 1.5437 -0.12% 0.0846 
IP   0.256*** -6.01% 1.7234*   -4.82% 1.0857 
CU   0.319*** -3.65% 1.7317*   -3.24% 1.3350 
HS   0.281** -1.02% 0.9885 1.22% -1.0694 
DGO   0.398*** -4.56% 3.2828*** -5.71%    2.5341** 
NHS -0.104 -0.33% 0.9153 1.36% -0.8149 
PI 0.094 -0.53% 0.9634 0.56% -0.7182 
PCE   0.189*** -6.95% 1.8066*   -1.09% 0.2461 
LI   0.174*** -6.75% 1.0762 -1.56% 0.8598 
CS -0.222*** -1.90% 2.0148**  -2.21% 1.3186 
FO   0.040** -0.70% 0.9962 0.12% -0.0589 
BI   0.197*** -1.40% 1.2159 -1.87% 1.2158 
TRD   -0.014   0.00% 0.1045   3.91%  -1.9588*  
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improvements are significant, we run Diebold and Mariano (1995) tests on differences in 
mean squared errors (MSE).17 Since macroeconomic analysts, in contrast to stock market 
analysts, have no incentives to issue systematic overoptimistic or pessimistic forecasts the 
assumption of a quadratic loss function implied by the MSE is uncritical.  
By construction, the static adjustments cannot yield a larger RMSFE for the adjusted series. 
Nevertheless, the improvements are rather small. We observe a reduction of 8.38% at best. 
Moreover, the Diebold-Mariano tests find that only about 60% of the significantly biased 
forecast series can be improved. This is somewhat surprising since the static anchoring tests 
make use of forward looking information. Naturally, one would expect significant forecast 
changes whenever we get a significant anchoring test coefficient, at least for the static case.  
The results of dynamic adjustments are much worse. When we adjust forecasts dynamically 
we obtain almost no improvements. There are only two exceptions, CC and DGO for which 
forecast improvements are significant according to the Diebold-Mariano test. These 
correspond to a reduction in RMSFEs of nearly 8% for CC and less than 6% for DGO. On the 
other hand, we observe also two cases with significantly worsened forecast errors, i.e., NF and 
TRD. For all other series, changes in forecast errors are insignificant though large in some 
cases. For example, we observe the largest though insignificant forecast error change for RS, 
worsening the series’ RMSFE by around 15%. Since the dynamic adjustment best represents 
market participants’ approach to correct for the cognitive bias our results provide strong 
evidence against the economic significance of the anchoring bias. 
Moreover, note that the size of the anchoring coefficient is at best loosely related to the 
improvements. For instance the DGO bias coefficient is 0.398 and results in an RMFSE 
improvement of about 4.6%. In contrast the PCE anchoring bias coefficient is only 0.189 and 
                                                     
17
 The test we apply includes the small sample adjustment of Harvey et al. (1997).  
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leads to a considerable larger RMFSE reduction of about 7%. This odd pattern already 
suggests that the anchoring bias test results might be misleading, i.e., a sizable γˆ  does not 
necessarily lead to large forecast improvements. 
2.4.3 Analysts‘ Information Set 
Our theoretical analysis provides a possible – though disturbing – explanation for the 
disconnection of forecast improvements and γ coefficients. Equation (2.6) suggests that we 
may find a significant anchoring bias simply because analysts provide sophisticated forecasts 
by incorporating additional information beyond the univariate time series information. This is 
definitely not unreasonable. For example, just by reading the current newspapers, analysts can 
process other contemporaneous business news. Technically speaking, γ coefficients may just 
reflect that analysts can forecast part of the innovation in the data generating process by 
drawing on a richer information set. This implies that survey forecasts are efficient – not 
inefficient as indicated by the anchoring bias test results.  
To analyze whether survey forecasts actually outperform time series forecasts, we compare 
analysts’ median forecasts 
tF  for a given month t with a mechanically generated “optimal” 
univariate time series forecast ( TStF ) for the actual macroeconomic release tA  obtained from 
the rolling estimation (10 year window) and prediction using Equation (2.7). Table 2.5 reports 
the results. The first column shows the parameters p, d, q for the most frequently best fitting 
ARIMA model. For example, for ISM a specification with p=1, d=0 and q=0, i.e., a simple 
AR(1) model, turns out to provide the best fit in most cases. Similarly, for the majority of the 
other series the optimal model is rather simple. Columns (2) and (3) of Table 2.5 provide a 
comparison of forecast errors (RMSFE) of our out-of-sample time series forecasts and 
analysts’ predictions, respectively. Column (5) reports the relative difference. For every single 
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macroeconomic series the RMSFE of analysts’ forecasts is smaller, for most series by more 
than 20% implying economically significant better forecasts. To evaluate the statistical 
significance of these forecast improvements, we again use a Diebold-Mariano test with small 
sample adjustment. For 20 out of the 23 series we find significant differences in MSE. For the 
remaining three series, i.e., core PPI, HS, and CS, analysts’ forecasts have a smaller error as 
well, though the differences are statistically insignificant. Hence, in line with previous 
 
Table 2.5 Best Performing Time Series Model 
In column (1) this table reports the most frequent ARIMA specification from the rolling 
estimation procedure. Column (2) and (3) report the root mean squared forecast errors 
(RMSFE) of the time series forecasts and the original MMS data. Column (4) shows the 
percentage difference of the RMSFE, where negative values indicate superiority of the MMS 
data. Column (5) contains the results of a modified Diebold-Mariano test (DM) for MSE 
equality (H0: MSEtime series forecast = MSEMMS). *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% level, respectively. 
  
Most frequent 
 
RMSFE 
 
RMSFE 
   Indicator 
 
ARIMA(p,d,q) 
 
ARIMA 
 
MMS 
 
∆ RMSFE DM 
CC 0,1,0 6.48 5.20 -19.7% -5.46*** 
ISM 1,0,0 2.38 2.06 -13.5% -3.71*** 
NF 1,0,1 136.71 109.97 -19.6% -4.17*** 
UN 0,1,0 0.21 0.17 -15.3% -2.84*** 
HE 3,0,0 0.15 0.13 -10.8% -1.87*  
PPI 0,0,1 0.72 0.43 -39.6% -2.88*** 
PPI ex 0,0,0 2.10 0.29 -86.2% -1.04 
RS 0,0,1 1.15 0.73 -36.8% -3.14*** 
RS ex 1,0,0 0.96 0.53 -45.0% -2.25** 
CPI 0,0,0 0.26 0.13 -49.3% -3.33*** 
CPI ex 1,0,0 0.31 0.10 -68.3% -1.89*  
IP 1,0,0 0.63 0.33 -47.2% -4.77*** 
CU 0,1,0 0.56 0.40 -28.4% -4.18*** 
HS 1,1,0 1.71 0.08 -95.2% -1.54 
DGO 0,0,1 3.12 2.81 -9.8% -2.50** 
NHS 0,1,1 74.11 67.98 -8.3% -1.87*  
PI 0,0,0 0.46 0.31 -32.7% -3.30*** 
PCE 0,0,1 0.43 0.20 -52.7% -2.78*** 
LI 0,0,0 0.46 0.19 -59.3% -4.57*** 
CS 0,0,0 1.22 0.91 -25.4% -1.52 
FO 2,0,0 2.29 0.74 -67.5% -2.97*** 
BI 1,0,1 0.37 0.25 -32.7% -3.75*** 
TRD   0,1,1   2.93   2.46   -16.2% -3.01*** 
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research on equity analysts’ earnings forecast performance (see, e.g., Brown et al., 1987), our 
estimation results clearly show that analysts provide superior forecasts in comparison to 
optimally selected univariate time series models. 
Outperforming a model which optimally exploits univariate time series information can only 
stem from using a richer information set. To extract the forecast component which is 
unrelated to historical announcements (i.e., 
tZ ) we use Equation (2.8) and decompose tF  into 
a component explained by historical time series information and a residual ˆtZ . This residual 
could just represent noise picked up by analysts when producing their forecasts. In this case 
ˆ
tZ  would not help to predict ,tA or more precisely, would be uncorrelated with our estimate 
of the innovation in ,tA  i.e., .tˆε  
Correlations of ˆtZ
 
and 
tˆε  are reported in Table 2.6. Most importantly, we find solely positive 
and highly significant correlations of ˆtZ
 
and 
tˆε . This strongly suggests that ˆtZ  represents not 
just noise being picked up somehow by analysts. In contrast, the additional information 
component in analysts’ forecasts is able to predict some part of the innovation in 
announcements and therefore provides evidence that macroeconomic analysts possess certain 
predictive abilities. Since our approximated innovation 
tˆε  constitutes the unpredictable part in 
an announcement after optimally employing univariate time series information, the high 
correlation of ˆtZ
 
and 
tˆε
 
also suggests that analysts’ superior forecasting abilities stem from 
the incorporation of valuable additional information. Again, this finding is in line with studies 
analyzing stock analysts’ forecast performance. For instance, Fried and Givoly (1982) 
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document that stock analysts’ outperformance over time series models is based on 
autonomous, i.e., additional information.18  
Table 2.6 Residual Correlations 
This table reports the variances of the innovation in announcements 
tˆε  and the approximated 
additional information component in survey forecasts ˆtZ , which we retrieved from optimally 
fitted distributed lag models as described in section 1. In addition, the correlation of 
tˆε  and 
ˆ
tZ
 
is provided. ***, **, and * denotes significance of these correlations at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% level, respectively. 
Indicator   ˆ( )tVar ε    ˆ( )tVar Z  
 
ˆ ˆCorrelation( , )t tZ ε  
CC 41.73 5.06 0.68*** 
ISM 5.31 0.92 0.50*** 
NF 19000.00 5182.06 0.60*** 
UN 0.04 0.01 0.50*** 
HE 0.04 0.00 0.35*** 
PPI 0.40 0.12 0.82*** 
PPI ex 0.08 0.01 0.35*** 
RS 1.16 0.55 0.77*** 
RS ex 0.35 0.09 0.69*** 
CPI 0.07 0.04 0.82*** 
CPI ex 0.01 0.00 0.24*** 
IP 0.39 0.17 0.86*** 
CU 0.28 0.08 0.74*** 
HS 0.01 0.00 0.57*** 
DGO 10.79 1.40 0.50*** 
NHS 4396.60 447.31 0.41*** 
PI 0.18 0.08 0.71*** 
PCE 0.22 0.14 0.90*** 
LI 0.50 0.29 0.90*** 
CS 1.10 0.32 0.37*** 
FO 4.16 3.15 0.93*** 
BI 0.12 0.04 0.77*** 
TRD  6.69   1.30   0.53*** 
                                                     
18
 For example, it has long been argued that financial analysts provide more accurate earnings forecasts than 
univariate time series models because analysts use a broader information set than just the univariate time series 
of historical earnings. For earnings forecasts this enlarged information set presumably includes, among other 
things, macroeconomic information (e.g., Brown, 1993; Brown et al., 1987). 
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One potential source of valuable additional information is other macroeconomic news. Due to 
interrelations between macroeconomic indicators it is quite plausible that analysts utilize these 
releases in their forecast generation process. Therefore, other macroeconomic news should be 
able to, at least partly, explain the additional information approximated by ˆ .tZ  Especially 
indicators released early in the cycle and those with large information content about the state 
of the economy should be useful (Gilbert et. al., 2010). We regress ˆtZ  on all macroeconomic 
information available seven days prior to the announcements using a stepwise regression 
approach to identify the most influential indicators as described in Equation (2.9). Since ˆtZ  is 
the result of a first step estimation, inference in this second step might be inefficient due to the 
uncertainty inherent in the generated regressand. To control for a possible influence on the 
estimators’ covariance matrix we apply the adjustment proposed by Dumont et al. (2005). 
Table 2.7 shows the regression results for selected indicators. For the Producer Price Index 
excluding Food and Energy (PPI ex), for instance, the best fitting model comprises five other 
macroeconomic indicators, namely UN, CPI ex, CU, CS, and TRD, which contribute to the 
explanation of ˆtZ .  
Table 2.8 provides an overview for all indicators. The first column shows how many other 
indicators contribute to the explanation of ˆtZ , the second column reports the associated R
2
 
and the last column shows how often the indicator is useful to explain ˆtZ
 
of other 
macroeconomic series. The very early released CC, for example, helps to explain ˆtZ  of 9 
other macroeconomic series, i.e., it is contained in the best model for 9 other indicators. 
Overall, the results provide strong evidence that additional macroeconomic information can 
explain analysts’ outperformance over mechanically generated forecasts. Depending on the 
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indicator, between about 7.0% (CPI) and almost 81% (PCE) of the variation in ˆtZ  is 
explained by other macroeconomic information. On average, R-squares amount to 36%.  
Table 2.7 Additional Information Content for Selected Indicators 
This table reports the regression results of the following model: 
,t t tZ Mα β ϕ= + +  
where Zt denotes the approximated additional information component in survey forecasts and 
Mt a vector containing the available macroeconomic information set for 
the 23 considered indicators seven days prior to an announcement. A stepwise regression 
approach is used to obtain the models. *, *, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level, respectively. To account for the generated regressand problem we report adjusted p-
values according to the adjustment procedure introduced in Dumont et al. (2005). 
Indicator 
 
CC 
 
NF 
 
PPI ex 
 
RS ex 
 
IP 
 
DGO 
CC 0.792*** 0.001* -0.004*** 
ISM 2.592*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.064*** 
NF 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.001* 
UN 0.749*** 28.197*** 0.042*** -0.095** 0.201*** 
HE 0.389*** 
PPI -0.098** 0.163** 
PPI ex -0.122** 
RS 0.064* 0.132** 
RS ex 
CPI 0.197*** 0.312*** 
CPI ex 81.980** 0.195*** 0.823* 
IP 0.649*** 
CU 0.017*** -0.047*** 
HS 1.124** 
DGO -0.035*** 
NHS 0.066*** 0.000* 
PI -0.223* 
PCE 38.721*** -0.183** 0.273* 
LI 
CS 9.868*** 0.010** 0.038** 0.128** 
FO 0.073*** -0.171*** 
BI -0.067* 
TRD           -0.001***             
Furthermore, column (3) reveals that the most influential indicators are those which are 
released early and which are commonly viewed to be good indicators of current or future 
economic activity. Consequently, we find CC, ISM, NFP, UN, IP, CU and NHS to be the 
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most important components of the additional macroeconomic information set. ISM and NF 
for instance contribute in 12 out of 23 cases to the explanation of ˆtZ . Overall we find strong 
evidence that analysts use a comprehensive information set which supports our hypothesis 
that additional information is the driving force of the anchoring bias coefficients. 
Table 2.8 Additional Information Content, R-squared, and Indicator Frequency 
This table reports the number of explanatory variables in the vector of available 
macroeconomic information Mt in the regression 
,t t tZ Mα β ϕ= + +
 
the associated R-squared and the frequency of each indicator in Mt, i.e., in how many cases 
the respective indicator contributes to the explanation of Zt. 
Indicator # of variables in Mt R2 Frequency of indicator in Mt 
CC 
 
2 
 
0.121 
 
9 
ISM 
 
9 
 
0.199 
 
12 
NF 
 
7 
 
0.314 
 
12 
UN 
 
4 
 
0.128 
 
14 
HE 
 
6 
 
0.401 
 
5 
PPI 
 
3 
 
0.102 
 
8 
PPI ex 
 
5 
 
0.395 
 
6 
RS 
 
6 
 
0.248 
 
7 
RS ex 
 
8 
 
0.439 
 
3 
CPI 
 
2 
 
0.071 
 
6 
CPI ex 
 
5 
 
0.239 
 
4 
IP 
 
12 
 
0.414 
 
9 
CU 
 
10 
 
0.302 
 
10 
HS 
 
9 
 
0.388 
 
4 
DGO 
 
11 
 
0.535 
 
5 
NHS 
 
7 
 
0.318 
 
11 
PI 
 
7 
 
0.433 
 
4 
PCE 
 
7 
 
0.808 
 
7 
LI 
 
6 
 
0.201 
 
2 
CS 
 
6 
 
0.572 
 
7 
FO 
 
8 
 
0.768 
 
6 
BI 
 
11 
 
0.392 
 
6 
TRD   7   0.509   6 
       Min 
   
0.071 
  
Max 
   
0.808 
  
Mean 
   
0.361 
  
Median 
   
0.388 
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2.4.4 Simulation Results 
Our results so far indicate that the significant anchoring test results are largely due to the use 
of a more comprehensive information set than the test assumes. Additional evidence from our 
simulation is provided in Table 2.9. We report the fraction of significant anchoring parameter 
tests (in percentage points) requiring a significance level of 1%. Hence an entry above 1.0 
percent indicates that the test too often rejects the null hypothesis of no-anchoring for a given 
set of process parameters.  
Most importantly, the anchoring test performs well for simple forecasts (i.e., forecasts 
exploiting exclusively univariate time series information) but not for sophisticated ones (i.e., 
forecasts exploiting a more comprehensive information set). As expected, in around one 
percent of the simulation runs the anchoring test indicates that simple forecasts are 
significantly biased (at the 1% significance level), irrespective of the specific ARIMA 
specification. In contrast, the anchoring test strongly suggests that sophisticated forecasts are 
substantially anchoring biased. For some parameter constellations, we obtain in nearly 100% 
of the simulation runs highly significant anchoring test coefficients. In general, the anchoring 
test performs more poorly if we assume a higher correlation of the simulated tZ  and 

tε . 
Clearly, with a higher correlation the additional information becomes more valuable and the 
deviations of the sophisticated forecasts from the simple forecasts become more pronounced.  
Since the mechanically generated simple and sophisticated forecasts differ only with respect 
to the utilized information set, the simulation results clearly show that the anchoring test is 
strongly misled by additional information picked up by the sophisticated forecasts. The high 
correlations of ˆtZ
 
and 
tˆε  reported in Table 2.6 strongly support the notion that analysts are 
able to extract such additional information, most likely from previously released reports. 
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Table 2.9 Simulation Results 
This table reports simulation results for the anchoring test assuming that announcements of a 
given macroeconomic indicator series follow an AR(1) process (panel a) or an ARMA(1,1) 
process (panel b) or an ARIMA(1,1,1) process (panel c). For each process we allow for 
different parameter constellations, in particular, AR-parameters of 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, and 0.8 in 
combination with an MA-parameter of 0.2 and correlations between tεɶ  and tZɶ  of 0.2, 0.4, 
0.6, and 0.8 (see Appendix 2 C for more details). For these parameter combinations, we report 
the percentage of cases in which the anchoring test indicates that a series of one-step-ahead 
forecast is significantly anchoring biased at the 1% significance level despite the fact that the 
simulated forecast series is bias free. Left hand side tables report results for simulated 
“simple” forecast series (i.e., forecasts utilizing exclusively univariate time series 
information). Right hand side tables report test results for simulated “sophisticated” forecasts 
series (i.e., forecasts utilizing in addition the information contained in tZɶ , and thus, a more 
comprehensive information set). 
Panel a: ARIMA(1,0,0) processes 
Simple Forecasts Sophisticated Forecasts 
Correlation
 
( tεɶ , tZɶ )    Correlation ( tεɶ , tZɶ ) 
0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 
AR-par. 0.8 1.0% 1.2% 0.9% 1.5% xxx AR-par. 0.8 65.4% 56.7% 16.4% 2.2% 
0.6 1.4% 1.2% 1.2% 1.0% 0.6 80.4% 33.7% 8.2% 1.6% 
0.4 1.4% 1.2% 0.9% 0.8% 0.4 44.3% 17.5% 5.8% 1.0% 
0.2 1.2% 1.1% 0.8% 0.9% 0.2 37.4% 13.7% 4.1% 1.3% 
Panel b: ARIMA(1,0,1) processes 
Simple Forecasts Sophisticated Forecasts 
Correlation
 
( tεɶ , tZɶ )    Correlation ( tεɶ , tZɶ ) 
0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 
AR-par. 0.8 1.7% 1.0% 1.1% 1.2% xxx AR-par. 0.8 84.4% 31.8% 6.5% 1.4% 
0.6 1.1% 1.0% 1.1% 1.2% 0.6 63.5% 33.5% 10.2% 2.2% 
0.4 1.5% 1.0% 0.6% 1.1% 0.4 60.7% 26.2% 6.2% 1.6% 
0.2 1.1% 1.2% 1.3% 1.3% 0.2 44.9% 16.2% 5.6% 1.5% 
Panel c: ARIMA(1,1,1) processes 
Simple Forecasts Sophisticated Forecasts 
Correlation
 
( tεɶ , tZɶ )    Correlation ( tεɶ , tZɶ ) 
0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 
AR-par. 0.8 1.2% 1.0% 0.9% 1.1% AR-par. 0.8 67.3% 17.5% 3.6% 1.2% 
0.6 1.2% 1.2% 1.1% 1.2% 0.6 96.7% 50.1% 7.3% 1.3% 
0.4 1.6% 1.0% 1.1% 1.3% 0.4 99.8% 72.6% 12.5% 1.3% 
0.2 1.4% 1.5% 1.2% 1.2% 0.2 99.6% 63.4% 11.7% 1.7% 
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Hence, the additional information picked up by analysts may well explain the puzzling result 
of highly significant anchoring coefficients but insignificant gains from adjusting the 
forecasts.  
2.4.5 Empirical Decomposition of Anchoring Coefficients 
According to Equations (2.4) to (2.6) we can decompose the anchoring coefficient γˆ  into an 
“inefficiency” component 1γˆ
 
and an “additional information” component .2γˆ  Table 2.10 
provides statistics on 1γˆ
 
and .2γˆ  For comparison, static as well as dynamic γ estimates are 
displayed in columns (1) and (2), respectively. Column (3) shows the approximated γˆ  
calculated on the basis of Equation (2.4). In addition, columns (4) and (5) show the two 
components of γˆ , i.e., the “inefficiency” component 1γˆ  and the “additional information” 
component .2γˆ
19
 Most importantly, we find that 2γˆ  is quite large for most macroeconomic 
series. Considering only the 16 macroeconomic series with a significantly positive anchoring 
bias coefficient, we find that in 10 out of these 16 cases 2γˆ  accounts for more than 50% of the 
overall γˆ  and in another three cases for more than 25%. Hence, in line with the previously 
described results, this analysis again tells us that the use of additional information is largely 
responsible for the misleading test results. 
 
                                                     
19
 Table 2.10 supports the notion that the assumptions underlying our decomposition are realistic. In general, we 
find a high conformance between the original regression based coefficients and the approximated ones, for 
instance for ISM a value of 0.297 versus 0.315.  
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Table 2.10 Gamma Decomposition 
This table reports results of anchoring bias estimations: 
( )t t thS F Aγ η= ⋅ − + ,
 
where 
tS  denotes surprise, i.e., actual value ( tA )
 
minus MMS forecast (
tF ), and hA  is the 
h
 
months anchor (i.e., the mean of the h
 
previously released actuals). Column (1) contains 
the coefficients from the static test setting, column (2) reports the mean coefficients from the 
rolling estimation. Column (3) to (5) show the corresponding approximations of γˆ  and its 
decomposition into an “inefficiency” ( 1γˆ ) and an “additional information” ( 2γˆ ) component:  
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
' '
1 1
1 '
1
2 '
1
,
ˆ
,
ˆ
t t
t t
t t t
t t
Cov y x
Var x Var Z
Cov Z Var Z
Var x Var Z
γ
ε
γ
− −
−
−
=
+
−
=
+
 
 
 Test results  Model based approximation 
Indicator  
Static      
estimates     
γˆ
    
 
Dynamic 
estimates  
mean γˆ  
 
Total 
 
γˆ
 
 
Inefficiency 
component 
1γˆ  
Add. information 
component 
2γˆ  
CC1    0.940***  0.922  0.102  0.000 0.102 
ISM    0.297**   0.225  0.315  0.136 0.179 
NF    0.070     0.137  0.099  0.011 0.088 
UN1    0.054    -0.187  0.010  -0.010 0.020 
HE    0.516***  0.439  0.298  0.285 0.013 
PPI    0.315***  0.303  0.239  0.001 0.238 
PPI ex    0.205**   0.176  0.206  0.201 0.005 
RS    0.166***  0.183  0.150  0.118 0.031 
RS ex    0.275***  0.382  0.075  0.000 0.075 
CPI    0.150***  0.130  0.067  -0.026 0.092 
CPI ex   -0.214**  -0.149  -0.214  -0.158 -0.056 
IP    0.256***  0.204  0.189  0.026 0.163 
CU1    0.319***  0.268  0.072  -0.024 0.096 
HS1    0.281**   0.339  0.068  0.039 0.029 
DGO    0.398***  0.350  0.328  0.229 0.099 
NHS1   -0.104     0.557  0.188  0.133 0.055 
PI    0.094     0.153  0.101  0.060 0.041 
PCE    0.189***  0.250  0.128  0.065 0.062 
LI    0.174***  0.150  0.106  -0.007 0.113 
CS   -0.222*** -0.247  -0.210  -0.082 -0.128 
FO    0.040**   0.036  0.040  -0.002 0.042 
BI    0.197***  0.260  0.197  -0.036 0.233 
TRD1   -0.014     0.267  0.052  -0.007 0.059 
1
 The deviation between column (1) and (3) is largely due to neglecting non-stationarity. For details see Table 
2.11. 
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Table 2.11 Gamma Decomposition for Non-Stationary Macroeconomic Series 
This table reports results of anchoring bias estimations: 
( )t t thS F Aγ η= ⋅ − + ,
 
where 
tS  denotes the surprise, i.e., actual value ( tA )
 
minus MMS forecast (
tF ), and hA  is 
the h
 
months anchor (i.e., the mean of the h
 
previously released actuals) considering that the 
actual time series are non-stationary and therefore are regressed in changes. Column (1) 
contains the coefficients from the static test setting. Column (2) to (4) show the corresponding 
approximations of γˆ  and its decomposition into an “inefficiency” ( 1γˆ ) and an “additional 
information” ( 2γˆ ) component for integrated series (see Appendix 2 B):  
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
' '
1 1
1 '
1
2 '
1
,
ˆ
,
ˆ
t t
t t
t t t
t t
Cov y x
Var x Var Z
Cov Z Var Z
Var x Var Z
γ
ε
γ
− −
−
−
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−
=
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Indicator 
 
Static estimates 
γˆ
 
Model based 
approximate total 
γˆ
 
Inefficiency 
component 
1γˆ  
Add. information 
component 
2γˆ  
CC 0.066 0.102 0.000 0.102 
UN -0.034 0.010 -0.010 0.020 
CU 0.072 0.072 -0.024 0.096 
HS 0.071* 0.068 0.039 0.029 
NHS 0.069 0.188 0.133 0.055 
TRD   0.071*   0.052 -0.007 0.059 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
We find no support for the hypothesis that survey forecasts of macroeconomic data are 
anchoring biased. Despite highly significant anchoring coefficients in most forecast series, 
macroeconomic survey forecasts can hardly be improved. We attribute the misleading test 
results to the fact that the anchoring test itself is biased. While macroeconomic analysts easily 
outperform mechanically generated forecasts by incorporating additional information 
contained in other macroeconomic reports, the anchoring test neglects the possibility that 
43 
 
analysts use a comprehensive information set. This focus on univariate time series 
information is largely responsible for misleading results of the anchoring test. 
Our findings have important implications for a broad range of empirical studies relying on 
macroeconomic survey forecast, as we show that the anchoring test results are invalid. There 
is no need to replicate earlier studies with anchoring adjusted survey forecasts and further 
studies would not be well advised to adjust for this seemingly apparent bias. More generally, 
our results show that it is dangerous to test for a cognitive bias in a time series context which 
was previously only tested in controlled experiments. Especially when the prior information 
given to test participants has to be strictly controlled for, as in anchoring bias experiments, it 
is questionable whether a direct transfer in a time series setting is possible at all. Future 
research has to consider case-by-case whether a non-experimental setting is comparable to an 
experimental one and whether (implicit) informational constraints drive the results. Moreover, 
our results suggest that the analysis of analysts’ forecast models provides a fruitful approach 
for further research. An intriguing question is whether and to what extent other forecasts, such 
as equity analysts’ forecasts, can be better explained using a more comprehensive information 
set, for example, by including earnings information of related companies or information about 
overall business conditions. 
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Chapter 3 Macroeconomic Forecast Accuracy — 
Idiosyncratic Predictability and Analyst Characteristics  
3.1 Introduction 
Differentiating between more and less precise macroeconomic forecasters based on their 
characteristics is a desirable task. From an academic perspective this would allow to calculate 
better consensus measures representing a superior proxy for market participants’ expectations. 
For investors, obtaining more precise information directly translates into potentially higher 
profits.  
While there are approaches to differentiate equity analysts (e.g. Clement, 1999; Clement and 
Tse, 2005; Brown and Mohammad, 2010) and macroeconomic analysts (e.g. Brown et al., 
2008) based on their characteristics we argue that analysts can only benefit from superior 
skills or experience if the idiosyncratic predictability of a given indicator is taken into 
account. While some macroeconomic indicators are better predictable, for instance, due to 
earlier released information or a generally smoother process, other indicators are 
unpredictable. Consequently, analysts’ individual forecast performance for the 
idiosyncratically unpredictable indicators is rather random than systematic, i.e., does not 
depend on their characteristics. In contrast, if the indicator is better predictable, then certain 
skills and experience should translate into superb forecast accuracy and heterogeneity among 
analysts. Our results support this notion and provide evidence that the idiosyncratic 
predictability is a major factor for the performance of models differentiating accuracy based 
on analyst characteristics. We find that indicator specific experience, general ability, the 
number of covered indicators, as well as the forecast horizon contribute positively to forecast 
accuracy, i.e., reduce absolute forecast errors. Most importantly, we find that model 
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performance heavily depends on the idiosyncratic predictability of macroeconomic indicators. 
The relevance of analyst characteristics for forecast accuracy diminishes for general ability 
and disappears for the remaining characteristics with decreasing idiosyncratic predictability. 
Economic significance differs substantially between macroeconomic indicators with high and 
low idiosyncratic predictability. Consequently, we have to conclude that predictability has to 
be taken into account and that analyst characteristics are nearly immaterial for indicators 
which are hard to predict. 
Although general macroeconomic forecast quality, i.e., the absence of systematic or 
persistence inefficiencies, on the consensus level is largely agreed on (e.g., Pesando, 1975; 
Mullineaux, 1978; Pearce and Roley, 1985; Aggarwal et al., 1995; Schirm, 2003; Hess and 
Orbe, 2013) evidence concerning differences in individual forecast quality of macroeconomic 
analysts is mixed. Some studies provide evidence for different forecast quality among 
individual macroeconomic analysts (e.g. Zarnowitz, 1984; McNees, 1987; Zarnowitz and 
Braun, 1993; Kolb and Stekler, 1996; Brown et al., 2008). However, other articles, come to 
opposite conclusions (e.g. Stekler, 1987; Ashiya, 2006). Despite this disagreement, the 
relation between macroeconomic forecast accuracy differences and analyst characteristics is 
so far an untouched research area.20  In order to analyze the relation between idiosyncratic 
predictability, analyst characteristics, and macroeconomic forecast accuracy it is desirable to 
employ a model which showed its ability to detect relations between forecast accuracy and 
analyst characteristics. Surprisingly, despite the extensive strand of literature analyzing the 
association of equity analyst characteristics and earnings per share forecast accuracy (e.g. 
Clement, 1999; Clement and Tse, 2005; Brown and Mohammad, 2010) the established 
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 Only Brown et al., 2008 investigate the relation between analysts’ ability and forecast precision. However, 
their study design differs significantly with respect to the set of used variables as well as the employed model 
compared to recent research designs used to analyze the performance of equity analysts.   
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characteristics framework used in these studies has not been transferred to macroeconomic 
analysts although Zarnowitz (1984) already noticed that “… a further study of the 
characteristics, methods and results of the forecasters with the best records will be needed”. 
Moreover, none of the studies analyzes the association between analyst characteristics, 
accuracy, and idiosyncratic predictability differences.  
We find that the association between analyst characteristics and forecast accuracy heavily 
depends on idiosyncratic predictability of the respective macroeconomic indicator. While our 
results for the predictable indicators imply sizable benefits from differentiating between more 
and less skilled analysts, results for the unpredictable indicators are much weaker. We find a 
decreasing influence on forecast accuracy for some characteristics and for other 
characteristics the impact even disappears with diminishing idiosyncratic predictability. 
Consequently, we have to conclude that the idiosyncratic predictability is an important 
determinant which has to be taken into account whenever the relationship between 
characteristics and forecast accuracy is analyzed. 
Our findings have implications for different research areas. Most importantly we show that 
there is a relation between analyst characteristics and forecast accuracy, but the idiosyncratic 
predictability of an indicator has to be taken into account when employing an analyst 
characteristics model. There is only very limited differentiation among analysts’ accuracy if 
the figure to be forecasted is virtually unpredictable because analysts do not benefit from their 
abilities and experiences. In contrast, if the forecast target is predictable more skilled analysts 
have the opportunity to differentiate themselves form less skilled ones and consequently 
heterogeneity in characteristics translates into systematic forecast accuracy differences. A 
similar argumentation holds for equity analysts’ forecasts. While it is reasonable to assume 
that analysts obtain earnings guidance from the respective management and that they receive 
information in the course of the year idiosyncratic predictability is given for all companies. 
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However, more skilled analyst should outperform less skilled ones if the forecast task gets 
more complex. Consequently, we expect the association between equity analyst 
characteristics and accuracy to be more pronounced for companies which earnings are more 
difficult to predict than for companies with easy to forecast earnings.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 states the hypotheses. Section 
3.3 describes our research methodology and the data set. Section 3.4 provides the results and 
section 3.5 concludes. 
3.2 Hypotheses 
The idiosyncratic predictability across macroeconomic indicators differs significantly. While 
it is easy to predict certain indicators, it is harder to predict others. There are various reasons 
why some indicators are harder to predict. The employment report, for instance, is released 
very early within the monthly release cycle. Until its release there is only a very limited 
amount of information available to market participants. Consequently, it might be harder to 
predict nonfarm payrolls than for instance the consumer price index which is released later in 
the month. A report such as the employment report might therefore be idiosyncratically 
unpredictable. If it is unpredictable then analyst characteristics, e.g. whether an analyst is 
more or less experienced, do not matter and analysts’ forecast performance is more random 
than systematic. In contrast, if a series is idiosyncratically predictable, for instance because 
prior to the release other information concerning the reference month are already released, 
analyst characteristics matter. Idiosyncratic predictability therefore is a necessary condition 
for systematic forecast quality differences. Therefore we expect that only for these indicators 
analysts benefit from their skills and experience. Consequently, we hypothesize that analyst 
characteristics explain accuracy differences better for macroeconomic indicators which are 
idiosyncratically predictable and worse for less predictable ones. 
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To evaluate forecast accuracy and the relation to analyst characteristics depending on 
idiosyncratic predictability we rely on well established characteristics used in previous 
research analyzing the accuracy of equity research analysts.21 While some of these 
characteristics are directly observable, such as experience, there are others, e.g. ability, which 
are only indirectly observable. We classify characteristics in two categories, inherent 
characteristics such as experience and ability which the analyst possesses. Furthermore, there 
are exogenous characteristics on which the analyst explicitly decides on, i.e., at which point in 
time he submits his forecast or how many macroeconomic indicators he covers. 
Obviously, a more experienced analyst should perform his assigned task better than a less 
experienced one. Over time he gains a better understanding of the underlying driving forces 
and increases his forecast performance. Experience has two dimensions, general and indicator 
specific experience. While it is beneficial to have some general experience in performing 
forecasts, every single indicator has its own specific characteristics. To detect other indicators 
with predictive power for the series to be forecasted and to isolate relevant information which 
is not contained in databases, i.e., from the daily press, a certain degree of indicator specific 
experience is required to generate precise forecasts. Consequently, we hypothesize that 
analysts with more general or indicator specific experience in forecasting macroeconomic 
variables generate forecasts with smaller deviations from the actual released figures, i.e., are 
more precise. 
By default analysts gain experience with every forecast they submit. However, experience 
does not take into account the quality of these forecasts. It is possible that an analyst submits 
forecasts for years, however his precision might be inferior over the entire period. 
Consequently, he might be considered experienced, but this does not imply that he is a precise 
analyst. Therefore, we need a measure that takes an analyst’s ability to generate high quality 
                                                     
21
 See for instance Clement (1999), Clement and Tse (2005), and Brown and Mohammad (2010). 
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forecasts into account. Only if the analyst is able to set up a model properly, understands the 
interrelations between different macroeconomic indicators and can interpret the available 
information set correctly, he is able to generate precise forecasts. In contrast to experience we 
cannot directly observe ability, however, we can use an established measure (Brown and 
Mohammad, 2010) which proxies unobservable skills of the analyst, hereafter called general 
ability. As with experience we expect forecast accuracy to increase with higher general 
ability.  
A further forecast quality determinant is portfolio complexity, i.e., how many indicators an 
analyst has to follow. In contrast to the equity analyst literature, (e.g. Clement, 1999) which 
associates an increasing number of covered companies and industries with decreasing forecast 
precision, the situation is different in a macroeconomic forecasting context. Since 
interrelations between macroeconomic indicators are very distinctive, it is unfavorable for 
analysts to cover only a subset of the important indicators. The more indicators the analyst 
covers the better his understanding of the entire economy and the higher the likelihood that he 
identifies interrelations correctly and uses these information in his forecast generation 
process. Accordingly, we hypothesize that the more indicators an analyst covers, the better is 
his understanding of overall macroeconomic developments and consequently his forecast 
quality.  
Prior research of equity analysts’ accuracy determinants shows that the forecast horizon has a 
large negative influence on performance, i.e., analysts submitting their forecasts early tend to 
provide substantially less accurate forecasts than those who submit them late. There may be 
several weeks or even months between the forecasts of equity analysts. In contrast, 
macroeconomic analysts provide their forecasts within a very narrow window, usually within 
one week. However, even this short window might be enough to gather relevant information 
which might contribute to forecast quality (e.g. Hess and Orbe, 2013). The shorter the forecast 
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horizon, the longer the time span in which analysts can collect relevant data and incorporate 
this information advantage into their forecast. Therefore, we expect forecast accuracy to 
increase with decreasing forecast horizons. 
Since the literature analyzing the performance of equity analysts (e.g. Sinha et al., 1997; 
Clement and Tse, 2005) finds positive short-term persistence in forecast accuracy we include 
past forecast performance in our analysis. We refrain from including broker size as proxy for 
recourses available to the analyst, as common in the equity analyst literature, for several 
reasons. In contrast to equity analysts, macroeconomic analysts are not dependent on 
relationships to the covered companies which maintenance is associated with costs, e.g. 
participation on facility visits and travel expenses to analyst conferences.22 The 
macroeconomic analysts must not maintain relationships with agencies, because the leakage 
of information from the reporting agencies is highly unlikely. Furthermore, costs for the 
collection of information are very low for macroeconomic analysts, because macroeconomic 
data are freely available from the reporting agencies and in databases.23 Moreover, it is 
common that one analyst covers all indicators for one broker leading to virtually no 
differentiation based on the number of employed analysts as a proxy measure for broker size 
as usually used in the equity analyst literature.  
                                                     
22
 Although the company might invite the analyst on their costs, it is advisable for the broker to pay for the trip 
of the analyst to stay objective (see e.g. Code of Conduct for Financial Analysts from the Chartered Financial 
Analyst Institute). 
23
 The Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis provides free access to a broad set of US macroeconomic data in their 
online database called ArchivaL Federal Reserve Economic Data (ALFRED). 
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3.3 Methodology and Data Description 
Previous research analyzing the quality of macroeconomic forecasts on an individual level 
used the ASA-NBER Quarterly Economic Outlook Survey (e.g. Zarnowitz, 1984). However, 
it is desirable to have data on a higher frequency to have sufficient observations on the 
individual indicator level. This enables us to conduct our analysis on subsamples dependent 
on the idiosyncratic predictability of certain macroeconomic indicators. Consequently, we use 
monthly data for 20 macroeconomic indicators obtained from Bloomberg covering the report 
periods from July 1998 to July 2012 on a monthly basis. 
Let j denote analyst j, i the covered macroeconomic indicator and t the respective report 
period. Correspondingly, , ,j i tF denotes the forecast of analyst j for indicator i in period t and 
,i tA the actual announced figure for indicator i in period t. Our measure of forecast accuracy is 
the absolute forecast error (AFErr ) scaled by the corresponding indicator and time specific 
standard deviation to make the data comparable across the range of considered indicators in 
this study: 
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=  (3.1) 
.LAFErr  denotes the absolute forecast error from last period and is included in the model to 
control for short term persistence.  
In order to measure idiosyncratic predictability we define the reciprocal of the median scaled 
absolute forecast error of a given indicator as its predictability: 
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 Concerning the analyst characteristics we distinguish between indicator specific (SpExp ) 
and general experience (GenExp ): 
 , ,j i tSpExp  = number of previously reported forecasts of analyst j for indicator i until 
report period t. 
,j tGenExp  =  number of previously reported forecasts of analyst j until report period t.  
To measure analysts’ ability we follow Brown and Mohammad (2010) and define general 
ability ( GAbil ) as: 
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 (3.3) 
where Analyst Coveragei,t denotes the number of analysts submitting forecasts for indicator i 
in period t. F-Ability is a standardized ranking of analysts based on their indicator specific 
forecast performance. The most precise analyst receives a value of 1, the least accurate one a 
value of 0. To generate a broad measure of analysts’ ability, GAbil  averages the indicator 
specific ability scores for a given report period for all other indicators, i.e., excluding the 
score of the indicator which is analyzed. 
Our proxy measure of portfolio complexity is defined as the number of covered indicators:  
,j tCovInd =  measure for the number of covered indicators and defined as the number 
of indicators analyst j follows in report period t. 
53 
 
Since our dataset allows a daily identification of submitted forecasts, we are able to precisely 
calculate the time span between the forecast and the announcement date: 
, ,j i tHorizon = number of days between the announcement and the date analyst j 
 submitted his forecast for indicator i for report period t. 
Our dataset comprises many different indicators over a sample period characterized by 
turbulent periods. It is reasonable to assume that it was more difficult to predict certain 
indicators in certain months. For instance, the median of the absolute forecast error averaged 
across all analysts in a given month for nonfarm payrolls is about 60 thousand. After the last 
recession and the beginning of the recovery in the labor market in February/March 2010, 
macroeconomic analysts made forecast errors of 102 thousand for the April and 116 thousand 
for the May figures. This fact indicates that they were surprised by the turning point and that 
it was more difficult to predict those numbers than for instance in a period of stable growth. 
To control for this indicator-month effect we estimate the following equation using an 
indicator-month fixed effect estimator24:  
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 (3.4) 
where all variables are defined as described above and ε denotes the error term.  
Besides the analysts’ individual estimates and estimation dates, the dataset comprises the 
name as well as the broker the analyst works for. Our initial sample consists of 164,030 
observations for 20 indicators covering the report periods from July 1998 until July 2012. 
                                                     
24
 Note that this estimation procedure is equivalent to an OLS estimation with indicator-month specific dummy 
variables.  
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Table 3.1 reports the distribution of submitted forecasts over time as well as the number of 
analysts participating and the number of covered indicators. 
While the majority of indicators considered in this study are included in the sample right from 
the beginning (18 out of 20), the number of participating analysts is low in the first years. 
Starting with only 6 analysts in 1998, the number of survey participants steadily increases to 
about 100 in 2005 and stabilizes on this level. Along with the increasing number of analysts, 
the number of submitted estimates increases rapidly. Excluding the first five years in our 
analysis to reduce the effect of left censoring and to achieve a sufficient cross sectional 
variation in characteristics such as specific or general experience, we still retain 85.6% of the 
initial sample.  
Table 3.1 Yearly Summary Statistics 
This table reports the total number of submitted forecasts to Bloomberg across all indicators 
on a yearly basis (Number of Estimates), as well as the percentage each year's forecasts 
contribute to the overall sample (Number of Estimates as % of total sample). Furthermore, the 
number of participating analysts in each year (Number of distinctive Analysts) and the 
number of covered indicators (Number of distinctive Indicators) are shown. 
Year Number of 
Estimates 
Number of Estimates  
as % of total sample 
Number of distinctive 
Analysts 
Number of distinctive 
Indicators 
1998 113 0.07 6 18 
1999 3829 2.33 44 18 
2000 4697 2.86 47 18 
2001 5600 3.41 52 20 
2002 9344 5.70 73 20 
2003 12379 7.55 83 20 
2004 13391 8.16 90 20 
2005 13540 8.25 98 20 
2006 13726 8.37 90 20 
2007 15248 9.30 99 20 
2008 14939 9.11 97 20 
2009 14944 9.11 98 20 
2010 15615 9.52 98 20 
2011 16214 9.88 98 20 
2012 10451 6.37 99 20 
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While the number of analysts remains about constant from 2005 onward, the number of 
submitted forecasts increases over time.25 Consequently, the average number of submitted 
forecasts per analyst increases. This finding lends support to the view that the demand for 
macroeconomic forecasts increases and that broker spend more resources on the generation of 
these forecasts, highlighting the importance of a thorough quality analysis on the individual 
analyst level. 
Table 3.2 Indicator Specific Summary Statistics 
This table reports indicator names as well as the associated abbreviations (Abbr.), the month 
and year of the first observation (Start), and how many surveys are conducted for the 
respective indicator (Surveys), as well as the minimum, maximum and average number of 
participating analysts (Min, Max and Mean Analysts). 
  
 
 
Analysts 
Indicator Abbr. Start Surveys Min Max Mean 
Consumer Confidence  CC 08/98 166 3 79 62.1 
ISM Index  ISM 08/98 167 4 85 67.8 
Nonfarm Payrolls  NFP 08/98 167 4 94 74.7 
Unemployment Rate  UN 08/98 168 4 89 72.1 
Retail Sales  RS 07/01 133 41 85 73.2 
Retail Sales ex Auto  RSex 06/01 134 39 78 68.5 
Producer Price Index ex Food & Energy  PPIex 09/98 166 3 78 65.6 
Producer Price Index  PPI 09/98 165 3 81 68.1 
Consumer Price Index  CPI 08/98 165 3 86 70.8 
Consumer Price Index ex Food & Energy  CPIex 08/98 166 3 84 69.6 
Capacity Utilization  CU 09/98 163 3 73 60.9 
Industrial Production  IP 09/98 166 3 85 69.2 
Housing Starts  HS 10/98 166 5 82 65.9 
Leading Economic Indicator  LEI 07/98 169 4 63 51.8 
Durable Goods Orders  DGO 07/98 167 4 83 67.5 
New Home Sales  NHS 07/98 165 4 79 63.5 
Personal Consumption Expenditures  PCE 07/98 167 4 83 65.8 
Personal Income  PI 07/98 169 4 78 62.6 
Factory Orders  FO 08/98 166 4 71 59.1 
Business Inventories  BI 08/98 167 3 61 49.2 
 
                                                     
25
 Note that a linear extrapolation of the 2012 figures leads to 17,916 submitted forecasts. 
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Table 3.2 reports indicator specific sample statistics. Besides the date of the first survey 
(Start) it contains the number of surveys, as well as the minimum, maximum and average 
number of participating analysts. For all indicators our sample covers more than 10 years and 
the number of participating analysts varies from 3 to 94 across all indicators. Note that there 
are only 12 months in which the number of participating analysts takes the minimum value of 
3. The first decile already includes 48 participating analysts and the first quartile 60. 
Accordingly, we have a sufficient number of analysts in every month. 
3.4 Results 
As stated in section 3.2 we expect differences in model performance because it is more 
difficult to predict certain indicators. Accordingly, analyst characteristics are not equally 
important for forecast accuracy across all indicators. To provide evidence for our hypothesis 
that an indicator’s predictability has to be taken into account when dealing with accuracy we 
define our proxy measures for predictability in section 3.3 as the reciprocal of the median 
scaled absolute forecast error, see equation (3.2). Larger absolute forecast errors imply that a 
certain macroeconomic series is harder to predict, i.e., idiosyncratic predictability is low, and 
that the analyst can be very experienced and able, however, if the series is not or only hardly 
to predict these characteristics do not help him at all. For the following analysis we group 
indicators into quartiles according to their predictability. The classification along with 
indicator specific predictability is reported in Table 3.3. 
One reason for low predictability might be information constrains. Indicators which are 
released early in the release cycle and therefore contain much new information concerning the 
reference month should be less predictable. Later released indicators are likely more 
predictable due to the earlier released information.  
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Figure 3.1 illustrates the monthly release cycle and classifies the median number of days 
between the announcement date and the end of the reference month into a weekly scheme 
(Timeliness). Indicators which are released in a week relatively early after the end of the 
reference months are therefore considered as timelier than those released many weeks after 
the end of the reference month.  For instance the employment report, which includes the 
unemployment rate and nonfarm payrolls, is released three calendar days (median) after the 
last day of the reference period and consequently considered a very timely macroeconomic 
release. 
Figure 3.1 Monthly Release Cycle 
For each indicator the median number of calendar days between the announcement date and 
the last day of the respective reference month is illustrated. 
Indicator 
CC                                                                                                 
ISM                                                                                                 
NFP                                                                                                 
UN                                                                                                 
RS                                                                                                 
RSex                                                                                                 
PPIex                                                                                                 
PPI                                                                                                 
CPI                                                                                                 
CPIex                                                                                                 
CU                                                                                                 
IP                                                                                                 
HS                                                                                                 
LEI                                                                                                 
DGO                                                                                                 
NHS                                                                                                 
PCE                                                                                                 
PI                                                                                                 
FO                                                                                                 
BI                                                                                                 
Week    -1   +1   +2   +3   +4   +5   +6 
The results in Table 3.3 show a large dispersion of idiosyncratic predictability ranging from a 
high predictability of 0.84 for personal consumption expenditures (PCE) to low predictability 
of 0.39 for consumer confidence (CC). This finding provides evidence for our hypothesis that  
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Table 3.3 Indicator Specific Predictability and Timeliness 
Column (1) reports indicators’ predictability, column (2) the corresponding predictability 
quartile and column (3) the median number of weeks the announcement date lies behind the 
last day of the reference month. 
Indicator Predictability Quartile Timeliness 
PCE 0.84 1 5 
LEI 0.79 1 3 
BI 0.79 1 7 
CPI 0.76 1 3 
CU 0.74 1 3 
PI 0.73 2 5 
FO 0.69 2 5 
PPI 0.64 2 3 
RS 0.61 2 2 
RSex 0.60 2 2 
IP 0.59 3 3 
DGO 0.56 3 4 
PPIex 0.55 3 3 
UN 0.52 3 1 
CPIex 0.52 3 3 
ISM 0.50 4 1 
NFP 0.50 4 1 
NHS 0.47 4 4 
HS 0.44 4 3 
CC 0.39 4 -1 
there really is a large variation in idiosyncratic predictability. Note that the early released 
indicators, CC, NFP, UN and ISM, i.e., those for which basically no prior information about 
the reference month is available, range among the indicators with the lowest predictability. 
The correlation between predictability and timeliness is 0.66 and emphasizes that there is a 
relation between idiosyncratic predictability and the amount of information that is already 
released before the respective indicator is announced. However, low predictability, i.e., high 
median absolute forecast errors, might simply be due to missing efforts of analysts to generate 
precise forecasts, because they consider these indicators as unimportant. Nevertheless, the fact 
that such important indicators as NFP and CC are in the bottom predictability quartile rules 
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this argument out because macroeconomic analysts have a keen interest to forecast those 
indicators. 
Table 3.4 reports correlations as well as summary statistics of our variable set. Note that the 
shown correlations are for indicator and report period demeaned variables since the fixed 
effect estimator uses these transformed variables. We find solely significant correlations 
between our dependent and the independent variables except for Horizon. Furthermore, all of 
these correlations have the predicted sign. We find a positive correlation between AFErr and 
L.AFErr implying short-term persistence, i.e., small absolute forecast errors are followed by 
small ones on the individual analyst level. For the remaining significant variables we find 
negative correlations.  
Table 3.4 Correlation Coefficients and Summary Statistics 
Panel A reports Pearson correlation coefficients for the demeaned dependent as well as the 
independent variables and Panel B the corresponding summary statistics. AFErr denotes the 
scaled absolute forecast error, L.AFErr the absolute forecast error from the previous period, 
SpExp specific experience, GenExp general experience, GAbil the general ability measure, 
CovInd the number of covered indicators, and Horizon the forecast horizon. *, **, *** indicates 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
Panel A: Correlation Coefficients 
  AFErr L.AFErr SpExp GenExp GAbil CovInd Horizon 
AFErr 1.00 
      
L.AFErr 0.03*** 1.00 
     
SpExp -0.01*** -0.01*** 1.00 
    
GenExp -0.01*** -0.01*** 0.96*** 1.00 
   
GAbil -0.09*** -0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 1.00 
  
CovInd -0.01** -0.02*** 0.30*** 0.25*** 0.01*** 1.00 
 
Horizon 0.00 0.00 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.00 0.02*** 1.00 
Panel B: Summary Statistics 
  AFErr L.AFErr SpExp GenExp GAbil CovInd Horizon 
Mean 1.96 1.69 43.60 56.00 0.62 18.37 7.34 
Median 1.71 1.53 35.00 48.00 0.62 20.00 5.00 
10th Percentile 0.00 0.00 5.00 9.00 0.50 12.00 1.00 
90th Percentile 3.99 3.45 97.00 117.00 0.72 22.00 11.00 
60 
 
Overall correlations are low, however the results are in line with those in the equity analyst 
literature (e.g. Clement, 1999), except for the high correlation between specific and general 
experience. The high correlation of 0.96 indicates two problems. First, we face 
multicollinearity and the model will not be able to attribute the importance to each individual 
variable correctly. Second, the high correlation indicates that the vast majority of analysts 
predict all indicators. If this is the case, then specific and general experience increase in 
lockstep and there is little additional information of knowing both variables. Since we include 
a measure of general ability in our model we abandon the inclusion of general experience in 
the further analysis and keep specific experience. Consequently, our model reads: 
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Before we perform the analysis on the quartile level to investigate the impact of idiosyncratic 
predictability we analyze the influence of analyst characteristics on the full sample to make 
sure that the framework is transferable to macroeconomic predictions. Table 3.5 reports 
results of the fixed effect estimation of Equation (3.5) for three different sample periods. 
Column (1) shows results for the entire sample period after an initialization period of five 
years as described in section 3.3. Column (2) and (3) show sub-sample results for an equally 
divided sample to check for robustness over time.  
Results for the entire sample are predominately in line with the hypothesis stated in section 
3.2. We find a positive significant relationship between absolute forecast errors in report 
period t and t-1 indicating short term persistence in forecast errors. Furthermore, coefficients 
for indicator specific experience (SpExp), general ability (GAbil), i.e., the analyst inherent 
characteristics are significantly negative, meaning that more specific experience and general 
ability lead to smaller forecast errors. Surprisingly, the exogenous characteristics, i.e., the 
number of covered indicators (CovInd) and the forecast horizon are insignificant. This finding  
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Table 3.5 Fixed Effect Regression Results 
This table reports results of the fixed effects estimation according to: 
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where AFErr denotes the scaled absolute forecast error of analyst j for indicator i in report 
month t, L.AFErr the absolute forecast error from the previous period, SpExp specific 
experience, GAbil the general ability measure, CovInd the number of covered indicators, and 
Horizon the forecast horizon. Column (1) reports results for the entire sample, i.e., 01/2003-
07/2012, column (2) reports results for the sub-sample 01/2003-10/2007, and column (3) for 
the sub-sample 11/2007-07/2012. R2 denotes the within R-squared of the regression. *, **, *** 
indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
01/2003-07/2012 01/2003-10/2007 11/2007-07/2012 
  AFErr AFErr AFErr 
L.AFErr 0.0219*** 0.0171*** 0.0257*** 
SpExp -0.0002** 0.0004** -0.0004*** 
GAbil -0.9902*** -0.9325*** -1.0198*** 
CovInd -0.0011 -0.0012 -0.0030*** 
Horizon 0.0000 0.0000 0.0080*** 
Obs  139,470  66,144 73,326 
R2  0.0080 0.0070 0.0100 
is in sharp contrast to findings in the equity analyst literature (e.g. Clement, 1999; Clement 
and Tse, 2005) where especially the forecast horizon plays an important role. 
While the low R2 suggests that the economical significance is low, there are substantial gains 
applying our model. For instance, consider the comparison of two analysts’ general ability 
and holding all other factors constant. One ranges in the bottom decile (GAbil=0.5) the other 
one in the top decile (GAbil=0.72).26 Our results imply that the more able analyst has an about 
0.22 lower (scaled) absolute forecast error than the less able analyst. Taking the average 
(scaled) absolute forecast error from Table 3.4, which is 1.96 this numerical example implies 
that the able analyst is on average about 11% more precise than the less able analyst and 
therefore the economic significance is sizable.  
                                                     
26
 See Table 3.4. 
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Results for the first sub-sample are largely in line to the overall sample results. However, we 
observe a positive coefficient for specific experience, which is in contrast to our hypotheses 
and economic intuition. For the second sub-sample all coefficients have the predicted sign and 
are highly significant. This finding suggests that the used variables need more than five years 
as initialization period to get enough cross sectional variation. Most notably, the relationship 
between accuracy and general ability as well as past accuracy is very robust across all periods.    
To analyze the relevance of idiosyncratic predictability we perform an analysis on the quartile 
level according to the classification in Table 3.3. Table 3.6 reports results for the fixed effect 
estimation. 
Table 3.6 Fixed Effect Regression Results Quartile Predictability Ranking 
This table reports results of the fixed effects estimation according to: 
                
, , 1 , , 2 , , 3 , ,
4 , 5 , , , ,
.
,
j i t j i t j i t j i t
j t j i t j i t
AFErr L AFErr SpExp GAbil
CovInd Horizon
α β β β
β β ε
= + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅
+ ⋅ + ⋅ +
 
where AFErr denotes the scaled absolute forecast error of analyst j for indicator i in report 
month t, L.AFErr the absolute forecast error from the previous period, SpExp specific 
experience, GAbil the general ability measure, CovInd the number of covered indicators, and 
Horizon the forecast horizon. Column (1) reports results for the indicators in the first 
predictability quartile according to Table 3.3 and column (2) to (4) for the second, third and 
fourth quartile. R2 denotes the within R-squared of the regression. *, **, *** indicates 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
Quartile 
  1 2 3 4 
L.AFErr 0.0471*** 0.0088* 0.0215*** 0.0071 
SpExp -0.0005*** -0.0004** 0.0000 0.0001 
GAbil -1.3354*** -1.3373*** -0.8989*** -0.4969*** 
CovInd -0.0053*** 0.0004 -0.0010 0.0007 
Horizon 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0003 
Obs  31,996  34,929  36,798  35,747 
R2  0.017 0.013 0.007 0.002 
Notably, general ability appears to be the most important variable. For all quartiles we obtain 
highly significant coefficients. Most importantly, the impact of general ability on accuracy 
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decreases with diminishing predictability. For the indicators which are best predictable we 
observe a regression coefficient of -1.33 compared to about -0.5 for the least predictable 
indicators. This finding implies that analysts’ general ability is more important for indicators 
which are idiosyncratically predictable because for these indicators the forecast task is 
feasible at all. For the generally unpredictable series analysts even do not benefit from their 
general ability simply because the forecast task is almost impossible and individual forecast 
performance is unsystematic. Combining the regression coefficients with the respective 
bottom and top decile general ability figures27 translate into about 20% more precise 
predictions for the most able analysts compared to the less able ones for the indicators 
included in the first predictability quartile compared to approximately 5% for those indicators 
in the fourth quartile. The huge difference in economic significance highlights the importance 
of a proper differentiation based on idiosyncratic predictability. Accordingly, this finding 
provides strong evidence for our hypothesis that model performance heavily depends on 
idiosyncratic predictability. 
Furthermore, we find that forecast quality does only benefit from indicator specific experience 
if the indicator ranges in the two upper quartiles of predictability. For both quartiles with the 
lowest predictability, indicator specific experience has no effect on forecast accuracy. This 
finding further supports the notion that predictability has to be taken into account. If an 
indicator is not predictable than indicator specific experience does not help to improve 
forecast quality, because accuracy is not systematically related to this characteristic. For the 
fourth quartile even the previous month’s accuracy loses its significance, i.e., there is no short 
term persistence of accuracy. This again highlights that it is very difficult to systematically 
                                                     
27
 For details see Appendix 3 A. 
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generate superior forecasts for these macroeconomic indicators. Lastly, only for the first 
quartile our measure for portfolio complexity, the number of covered indicators, is significant. 
A larger set of covered indicators consequently implies lower forecast errors for only those 
indicators which are classified as highly predictable lending support to the notion that it pays 
off for analysts to have a sound understanding of the entire economy and the interrelations 
between different macroeconomic indicators.  
There is not only a pattern in model performance in terms of the impact of certain 
characteristics on accuracy, but also in terms of explanatory power. Although R-squared is 
low compared to results in the equity analyst research literature, there are large differences 
depending on predictability. While R-squared for the entire sample is 0.8% (see Table 3.5) it 
varies between 0.2% and 1.7% from the fourth to the first predictability quartile. 
Consequently, also on a low level, the explanatory power varies considerably. However, 
despite low level of R-squared economic significance, i.e., sizable forecast accuracy 
improvements exist as shown before. 
If an indicator is idiosyncratically not predictable, even the best analysts do not perform better 
than an average analyst. Consequently, there is no differentiation between good and bad 
analysts and the characteristics model, i.e., Equation (3.5) cannot detect differences. If on the 
other hand predictability is high, there is competition among macroeconomic analysts and 
above average analysts generate superior forecasts. 
3.5 Conclusion 
Evidence concerning accuracy differences among macroeconomic analysts is mixed. 
Furthermore, the association between accuracy differences and characteristics of 
macroeconomic analysts has not been analyzed so far. Moreover, neither the studies analyzing 
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macroeconomic forecast accuracy differences, nor those analyzing equity analysts’ earnings 
per share forecasts take the idiosyncratic predictability of the forecast objective into account.  
We analyze the relation between an indicator’s idiosyncratic predictability, macroeconomic 
analyst characteristics and forecast accuracy differences. The main idea is that analysts’ 
forecast performance is rather random than systematic if the respective macroeconomic 
indicator is idiosyncratically unpredictable, because more skilled analysts do not benefit from 
their superior skills. For those series which are predictable, superior skills translate into more 
accurate forecasts. 
Our results provide evidence that there is some degree of heterogeneity among 
macroeconomic analysts and that their forecast performance differs. On the one hand, we find 
only a limited advantage of following certain analysts for macroeconomic series with low 
idiosyncratic predictability. The characteristics model has little explanatory power for these 
indicators and analyst characteristics are more or less immaterial. Only if the forecast 
objective is idiosyncratically predictable analyst characteristics, especially the inherent ones, 
contribute to forecast accuracy and the economic significance of our results is sizable. 
Consequently, for those indicators it is worth to choose an analyst based on the characteristics 
and method used in our analysis.  
Our results have implications for researchers and users of macroeconomic as well as equity 
analysts’ forecasts. Macroeconomic forecast quality differs across analysts, however only for 
series idiosyncratically predictable these differences are detectable and worth the effort to 
choose the corresponding analysts. The question arises whether the idiosyncratic 
predictability of company earnings plays a comparable role for model performance analyzing 
equity analysts’ accuracy. Only if company earnings have a certain degree of idiosyncratic 
predictability skilled analysts are able to outperform less skilled ones. Consequently, it is a 
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fruitful approach for future research to analyze whether analysts’ accuracy differences are 
more pronounced for those companies whose earnings are idiosyncratically more predictable. 
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Chapter 4 Do Aggregate Company Outlooks have 
Macroeconomic Content? 
4.1 Introduction 
The state determination of the economy and the prediction of future macroeconomic 
developments are essential for many purposes, e.g., to guide monetary policy decisions or 
decisions about federal tax cuts to stimulate economic growth. In this context coincident and 
leading macroeconomic indicators play an important role. Economic agents rely on them to 
gauge how the economy is doing and how it will likely do in the future. To measure economic 
activity these indicators incorporate a wide information set of macroeconomic variables, such 
as industrial production and capital market related measures, such as interest rate spreads and 
stock returns. Company expectations as a valuable source of information to forecast overall 
economic activity, however, are not directly included. To a substantial extent the economy 
consists of firms listed on the stock market. About one-third of all employees in the U.S. 
private business sector work at publicly traded companies (Davis, 2006). Therefore, the 
development of the overall economy is significantly related to the development of these firms 
as a whole. In this paper we show that aggregated company outlooks predict overall economic 
activity, i.e., combined forecasts of individual parts of the economy predict the entire 
economy. As a proxy for individual company level outlooks we use analysts’ stock 
recommendations, since analysts have direct access to company specific information and 
therefore their information set is arguably the best available proxy for company specific 
forecasts.  
At the firm level, company managers must make various decisions that are of great 
importance for the company such as investment decisions, financing decisions, employment 
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decisions etc. Moreover, managers plan their actions ahead by setting specific goals. For 
example, the decision of managers to lay off a significant amount of the company’s workforce 
in the next couple of months to cut expenses is a crucial decision for the future development 
of the company. Nevertheless, decisions at the firm-level are ceteris paribus not important for 
the overall economy. However, aggregated projected layoffs over all companies, which in 
sum constitute a significant amount of the entire economy, are basically a crucial input to 
forecast future employment figures. The same argumentation holds for other company 
specific information such as orders, production, and capacity utilization. Every company 
outlook includes growth perspectives and therefore information whether the management 
assumes a more optimistic or pessimistic development of the company over the next months 
and years. Consequently, aggregated expectations over all companies contain predictive 
power for future macroeconomic developments. 
Observing and predicting the entire economy is similar to observing all companies in the 
economy simultaneously and aggregating these observations. Unfortunately, we cannot 
observe managers’ expectations directly and a survey of all companies is unfeasible for 
several reasons (e.g., cost, timing etc.). However, stock analysts collect and process all kinds 
of information at the firm level for publicly traded companies. Besides public 
macroeconomic-, industry- and company-specific content their information sets should also 
comprise non-public company-specific information (Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980). By 
attending analysts’ conferences, management meetings, and telephone conferences, stock 
analysts develop a sound understanding of the company’s business and its future 
performance. Due to their extensive company knowledge their information set is arguably the 
best available proxy measure for company specific outlooks. In addition to public company 
information it presumably contains company-specific information that is not public 
knowledge. Analysts issue stock recommendations that indicate a general direction of the 
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development of the underlying company: A positive recommendation suggests in general a 
relatively positive development, while a negative recommendation suggests in general a 
relatively negative development. We show that aggregating these signals over all companies 
listed on the stock market allows conclusions about the overall economy. 
The existing literature provides support for our new approach to combine macroeconomic 
developments with stock analysts’ outputs. Previous literature indicates that analyst 
recommendations have predictive power for stock returns on a firm-level, i.e., analysts 
possess a unique company specific information set. Womack (1996) shows that 
recommendations lead to a significant post-announcement drift up to 6 months. Barber et al. 
(2001) demonstrate that a trading strategy based on recommendations yields significant 
excess returns before transaction costs. Howe et al. (2009) find that aggregated 
recommendations predict future excess returns on a market level. Stock returns in turn have 
predictive power for macroeconomic activity. Stock and Watson (1998) provide evidence that 
the stock market leads the real economy. Consequently, it is reasonable to analyze the 
predictive power of analysts’ recommendations for macroeconomic developments. If 
analysts’ outputs can forecast stock market developments and the stock market anticipates 
macroeconomic developments, then analysts’ recommendations should also contain predictive 
power for the real economy. 
To the best of our knowledge, we provide the first study to show this link. To do so we use 
monthly changes in aggregated analysts’ recommendations as a proxy for changes in 
aggregated company outlooks. We evaluate the predictive power of company outlook changes 
for future macroeconomic developments by using a regression framework in which we 
analyze the relation of recommendation changes to changes in a broad measure of economic 
activity. Our results provide evidence that aggregated company outlooks have predictive 
power for future macroeconomic developments of about one year. Our results remain valid 
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when we control for other well-known macroeconomic predictors, such as the term-spread 
and the dividend yield. We find that the predictive power of aggregated company outlooks is 
not included in the leading economic indicator (LEI) – which specifically has been developed 
to forecast economic activity – and other well-known macroeconomic predictors.  
Overall, we show that aggregated company outlooks are an important macroeconomic 
variable that has been overlooked so far when forecasting economic developments. This result 
might be especially of interest to agencies which release economic indicators as well as to 
investors who might incorporate this information to form better expectations of upcoming 
overall economic activity. Our results also suggest that analysts implicitly or explicitly 
anticipate macroeconomic developments when processing information in their stock 
recommendations. The change in the aggregated monthly consensus has predictive power for 
the upcoming economic development up to about one year. Indicating that analysts have first-
hand information about the individual firms they cover, our findings therefore also support the 
theoretical notion that analysts play an important role as financial intermediaries (Grossman 
and Stiglitz, 1980). Moreover, our results indicate a link between previous studies: Stock and 
Watson (1998) show that the stock market leads the real economy, while Howe et al. (2009) 
provide evidence that aggregated analysts’ recommendations predict the overall stock market. 
Our results fill the missing link between both studies, since we find that aggregated analysts’ 
recommendations also predict the real economy. We provide evidence that changes in 
expectations about future firm performance rationally (i.e., correct on average) determine 
asset values before overall economic activity changes. Therefore, our results provide a 
potential explanation, why the stock market leads the real economy. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 4.2, we introduce the research 
design. Section 4.3 describes the data. Section 4.4 discusses the empirical results. Finally, 
section 4.5 concludes. 
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4.2 Research Design 
We consider the following general model to forecast overall macroeconomic activity: 
 t t t tEconomicActivity AggregatedCompanyOutlooks, .τ α β ε+ = + ⋅ +  (4.1) 
Unfortunately, company outlooks cannot be observed directly. We argue that a good proxy for 
company outlooks are assessments of analysts who cover the companies and therefore process 
company expectations. Sell-side analysts aggregate a vast amount of information on the 
company level in their role as information intermediaries on financial markets. Since analysts 
possess a first-hand information set about the covered companies, it is straightforward to 
approximate companies’ expectations with analysts’ outputs. Our approach is supported by 
the theoretical notion that analysts’ outputs should contain more than just public knowledge 
(Grossmann and Stiglitz, 1980). 
However, since analysts issue two key outputs, namely earnings per share (EPS) forecasts and 
stock recommendations, the proxy measure’s choice should be carefully considered. We 
decide to focus on stock recommendations28 for the following reasons. First, revisions of 
earnings forecasts might be based on stale information, while revisions of stock 
recommendations are not (Jegadeesh and Kim, 2010). Second, recommendations contain 
more information than earnings forecasts. A recommendation reflects the upcoming yearly 
earnings, as well as all future earnings, the payout ratios and discount rates. Therefore, to 
determine the value of a company the analyst needs interest rates, risk premiums and growth 
expectations as inputs in addition to EPS forecasts. These are basically the same information 
the company manager has to consider when making investment decisions for the firm. 
                                                     
28
 As an alternative measure, we analyze the predictive content of changes in aggregate earnings forecasts. The 
results are discussed in section 4.4. 
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Consequently, solely using EPS forecasts is not sufficient because a substantial proportion of 
the information would be neglected. Third, a measure with “natural” boundaries is preferred 
to identify significant expectation changes.29 While small changes of EPS forecasts might be 
due to minor changes in expectations, a recommendation revision is the result of major 
changes and therefore it is a clear interpretable signal that the companies’ prospects changed 
significantly. Fourth, it is desirable to have a proxy measure undistorted by the impact of 
accounting policies and accounting standard changes. A company is easily able to influence, 
to a certain degree, their earnings per share by applying the accounting standards in different 
ways (“earnings management”). Therefore, analysts have to adjust their earnings forecasts 
even without a change in the underlying fundamentals. Moreover, our model would receive an 
incorrect signal if accounting standards are changed and as a consequence thereof all EPS 
forecasts change without fundamental reason, e.g., when stock option compensation is treated 
differently from an accounting perspective. Fifth, we avoid a “forecast horizon problem”, 
since recommendations are always valid for a certain future time period (usually up to one 
year if not revised) independent of the point in time of the fiscal year they are issued. In 
contrast, the forecast horizon of EPS forecasts is determined by the end of a firm’s fiscal year. 
For example, an earnings forecast issued on October, 1st, for a firm with a fiscal year end at 
December, 31st, has a forecast horizon of three months. An earnings forecast for the same firm 
issued one month later would have a forecast horizon of two months. Recommendations are 
easier to compare and to aggregate, since they are based on expectations for stable forecast 
periods. Following these considerations our main proxy measure for company outlooks are 
analysts’ recommendations. 
                                                     
29
 In I/B/E/S all recommendations are coded as integers between 1 (“Strong Buy”) to 5 (“Strong Sell”).  
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We are aware of the fact that analysts’ recommendations might be biased, for instance that 
they are overoptimistic.30 However, assuming that their incentive-driven overoptimism is 
constant over time this does not constitute a problem. Since we use recommendation changes, 
the positive bias cancels out.  
Our dependent variable in Equation (4.1), the measure for economic activity, is the 3-month 
moving average of the Chicago Fed National Activity Index (CFNAI) and the 3-month 
average of its four components.31 Based on the methodology of Stock and Watson (1999b) the 
index is a weighted average of 85 macroeconomic series from four categories: 23 series from 
production and income, 24 series from employment, unemployment, and hours, 15 series 
from personal consumption and housing, and 23 series from sales, orders, and inventories. 
The four categories’ contributions are for (1) Production and Income (PI) about 33%, (2) 
Employment, Unemployment, and Hours (EUH) 32%, (3) Personal Consumption and 
Housing (CH) 14% and (4) Sales, Orders and Inventories (SOI) 21%. The CFNAI is a “single 
summary measure of a common factor” (Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, 2012) in these 
series which is released monthly. It is constructed to have an average value of zero and a 
standard deviation of one. A positive value of the CFNAI implies economic growth above the 
historical trend, while a negative value corresponds to growth below the trend. The three 
month moving average of the CFNAI has desirable properties concerning the state 
determination of the economy. Compared to other measures, such as the GDP, the timely 
availability of the CFNAI provides valuable information about the state of the economy 
almost in real time on a monthly basis.32 
                                                     
30
 See for instance Jegadeesh et al. (2004). 
31
 For information on the CFNAI see www.chicagofed.org/webpages/research/data/cfnai/current_data.cfm. 
32
 For a quality evaluation of the CFNAI see for instance Evans et al. (2002). 
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Our analysis proceeds in 4 steps. First, for each month we calculate the consensus of stock 
recommendations issued in the respective month. In contrast to Howe et al.(2009), we solely 
use recommendations issued in the respective month and not all recommendations 
outstanding in the respective month to remove stale recommendations and to focus solely on 
the most recent information. In a second step, to measure the changes of managers’ 
expectations we calculate the monthly change of the consensus ( _ trec consensus ) in month t 
∆ trec . We define the monthly consensus change in month t as: 
 
1
1
_ _
_
t t
t
t
rec consensus rec consensus
rec
rec consensus
−
−
−
∆ =  (4.2) 
The monthly consensus change in t is the percentage change in the consensus of all stock 
recommendations issued in month t compared to month t-1. In the third step we quantify the 
in month t unknown upcoming change of the economic indicator ( CFNAI∆ ) between t and 
( )1,...,t Tτ τ+ = for different future time periods. Finally, in the fourth step, we perform a 
regression of the change of the economic indicator on the recommendation change, several 
lags of the dependent variable and various controls as specified in Equation (4.3): 
 , 1
2
, 1, ...,
N
n
t t t n t t
n
CFNAI rec control variable Tτ α β β ε τ+
=
∆ = + ⋅ ∆ + ⋅ + ∀ =∑  (4.3) 
where all variables are specified as previously described and 
tε denotes the error term.  
We estimate the model in different settings. First, we estimate the predictive power of a 
recommendation change for the future CFNAI development alone. In a second setting, to 
control for other common variables which possess macroeconomic prediction power, we 
specifically control for changes in the leading economic indicator ( lei∆ ), market excess 
returns (mex), dividend yield (divy), default spread (defs), term spread (tes), 3-month T-Bill 
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rate (3mtb), and three lags of the dependent variable. Third, we analyze the predictive power 
of the recommendation change for the four CFNAI components (IP, EUH, CH, and SOI) 
separately. Fourth, we only use stock recommendations issued for S&P 500 firms. Fifth, as an 
alternative measure for company outlooks, we evaluate the predictive power of changes in 
aggregate earnings forecasts. 
4.3 Data 
Table 4.1 Summary Statistics 
 
This table reports the abbreviations, units as well as summary statistics, i.e., the mean (µ ), 
standard deviation (σ ), as well as minimum and maximum values of our set of variables. 
These include the Chicago Fed National Activity Index (CFNAI) and the changes of the 
respective CFNAI components Production and Income (PI), Employment, Unemployment 
and Hours (EUH), Personal Consumption and Housing (CH), and Sales, Orders, and 
Inventories (SOI), the Recommendation Change, the recommendation change if only 
companies in the S&P 500 are considered (Reco. Change (S&P 500)), the Leading Economic 
Indicator (LEI), monthly market excess returns calculated as the difference of the monthly 
market index return and the monthly risk-free rate including all NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ 
firms (Market Excess Return), the Dividend Yield, the Default Spread (calculated as the 
difference between Moody’s Baa corporate bond yield and the 10-year Treasury constant 
maturity rate), the 3-months T-Bill rate, the Term Spread (calculated as the difference 
between the 10-year Treasury constant maturity rate and the 3-month T-Bill rate), as well as 
the number of submitted recommendations (monthly Recommendations). 
Variable Abbr. Unit µ  σ  Min Max 
CFNAI     Change -0.0023 0.2293 -1.0074 0.6226 
CFNAI IP     Change 0.0003 0.1245 -0.5467 0.3333 
CFNAI EUH     Change -0.0008 0.0775 -0.2934 0.2576 
CFNAI CH     Change -0.0020 0.0211 -0.1058 0.0845 
CFNAI SOI     Change 0.0003 0.0323 -0.1046 0.1433 
Recommendation Change ∆rec % Change 0.0002 0.0241 -0.0733 0.0629 
Reco. Change (S&P 500) ∆recS&P50
0 
% Change 0.0000 0.1109 -0.3456 0.4194 
Leading Economic Indicator LEI % Change 0.0022 0.0053 -0.0147 0.0154 
Market Excess Return mex % Change 0.41 4.67    -18.54     11.04 
Dividend Yield divy % 1.87 0.53 1.11 3.60 
Default Spread defs % 2.31 0.89 1.29 6.01 
3-months T-Bill rate 3mtb % 3.46 1.87 0.03 6.17 
Term Spread tes % 1.64 1.18 -0.53 3.70 
Monthly Recommendations  # 2572 644 1812 7709 
76 
 
Our sample ranges from January 1994 to March 2010. Table 4.1 shows means ( )µ , standard 
deviations ( )σ  as well as minimal and maximal values of the variables used in the analysis. 
We apply the Phillips–Perron test to verify that the time series data do not contain a unit-root 
and we do not find evidence for non-stationarity.33 
We obtain vintage data (whenever available) for the CFNAI and its four components34 from 
the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago to adequately describe the available information about 
the state of the economy at every single point of time.35 Figure 4.1 shows the CFNAI 
development from January 1994 to March 2010. 
Figure 4.1 CFNAI Development 
 
Analyst recommendations are obtained from the Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System 
(I/B/E/S). We use the following filters for the recommendations: (1) we only keep 
                                                     
33
 Results are reported in Appendix 4 A. 
34
 We use the 3-month moving average of the CFNAI and its components. 
35
 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago (2012). 
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recommendations for US-American firms to be consistent with the CFNAI measure, and (2) 
we drop 696 recommendations from our sample in order to control for obvious data base 
errors.36 Our final sample consists of 499,571 stock recommendations.  
We calculate the monthly aggregated mean analyst recommendation with the 
recommendations issued in the respective month. On average we consider 2,575 
recommendations issued per month. Figure 4.2 visualizes the aggregated analyst 
recommendations from January 1994 to March 2010. 
Figure 4.2 Average Consensus Recommendation  
 
In the I/B/E/S database the recommendations are coded as follows: 1= Strong Buy, 2 = Buy, 3 
= Hold, 4 = Sell, and 5 = Strong Sell. In line with previous literature (e.g., Jegadeesh and 
Kim, 2010) we reverse the ratings to facilitate a more intuitive interpretation. A Strong Buy 
receives the values of 5, a Buy a value of 4, a Hold a value of 3, a Sell a value of 2, and a 
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 Specifically, we drop recommendations that have been issued by the same analyst from the same broker on the 
same day for the same firm with the same rating. 
3.2
3.4
3.6
3.8
4
4.2
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
78 
 
Strong Sell a value of 1. Therefore, a higher consensus recommendation implies a more 
optimistic analyst outlook. Figure 4.2 illustrates that the overall recommendation level varies 
significantly in the analyzed 1994 to 2010 time period. Jagadeesh and Kim (2010) point out 
that the mean recommendation level dropped significantly in 2002 when analysts were 
alleged of being overly optimistic by the New York State Attorney General’s office. 
Data about the Leading Economic Index are obtained from Reuters. Monthly market excess 
returns are calculated by using the difference of the monthly market index return and the 
monthly risk-free rate including all NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ firms. We obtain the data 
for monthly market excess returns from the website of Kenneth French.37 We retrieve the 
monthly dividend yield from the homepage of Robert Shiller.38 The 3-month T-Bill rate, the 
default spread (calculated as the difference between Moody’s Baa corporate bond yield and 
the 10-year Treasury constant maturity rate), and the term spread (calculated as the difference 
between the 10-year Treasury constant maturity rate and the 3-month T-Bill rate) are obtained 
from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (2011). 
4.4 Results 
Table 4.2 shows the results of the univariate regression of the recommendation change on the 
upcoming CFNAI development. The column “Base Model” shows coefficient estimates of the 
model without any control variables. The results provide strong evidence that aggregate 
company level information has economic content. The aggregated stock recommendations 
have predictive power for the upcoming economic activity up to 7 months. Improving 
company outlooks, i.e., better recommendations ( 0∆ >rec ) imply positive changes of 
overall economic activity as measured by CFNAI changes. 
                                                     
37
 French (2011). 
38
 Shiller (2011). 
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Table 4.2 CFNAI Developments and Changing Company Outlooks 
This table reports results from the following model: 
, 1
2
, 1, ...,
N
n
t t t n t t
n
CFNAI rec control variable Tτ α β β ε τ+
=
∆ = + ⋅ ∆ + ⋅ + ∀ =∑ , 
where the “Base Model” β is estimated without control variables and the “Control Model” 
β is estimated with control for changes in the leading economic indicator ( lei∆ ), market 
excess returns (mex), dividend yield (divy), default spread (defs), term spread (tes), 3-
month t-bill rate (3mtb), and three lags of the dependent variable. Inference is based on 
Newey-West Standard Errors. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
level, respectively. 
Base Model Control Model 
Horizon 
 
1β  
 
1β  
1 2.250*** 2.042** 
2 2.879*** 2.635** 
3 2.981** 3.294*** 
4 2.207* 2.557** 
5 2.233* 2.651* 
6 2.564* 2.720* 
7 3.102** 3.539** 
8 2.005 2.610 
9 2.516 2.848* 
10 1.934 2.469 
11 1.276 2.953* 
12   1.192   2.066 
In a second setting (“Control Model”), we control for well-established macroeconomic 
variables as discussed in Section 4.2 to ensure that our measure is not just a summary measure 
of well-known variables which possess macroeconomic prediction power. We use changes in 
the leading economic indicator ( lei∆ ),39 market excess returns (mex), dividend yield (divy), 
default spread (defs), term spread (tes), 3-month t-bill rate (3mtb), and three lags of the 
dependent variable as control variables. The correlation matrix between the CFNAI changes 
and the control variables can be found in Appendix 4 B. 
                                                     
39
 The LEI combines 10 single series with predictive power.  
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When controlling for macroeconomic variables that are well-known predictors of economic 
activity the aggregated recommendation change is still significant. Except for the 1- and 2- 
months horizons the coefficients are even larger. The coefficients of the aggregated 
recommendation change predict the upcoming 1-month to 11-months changes of economic 
activity. The results show that our measure contains unique information not captured in the 4 
macroeconomic control variables as well as in the LEI, which was specifically designed to 
predict economic activity. While the control variables contain information about growth (LEI 
and dividend yield), risk premiums (market excess returns and default spreads) as well as 
interest rates (3-months t-bill rate and term spread) our results suggest that aggregate 
company outlooks contain even more information about the development of the economy.  
The results are economically significant. For example, the coefficient for the 1-month forward 
CFNAI change is 2.042, while the standard deviation of the recommendation change is 
0.0241. Therefore, a one standard deviation increase in the recommendation change suggests 
a change in the CFNAI for the upcoming month of 0.05. This is relatively high since the 
CFNAI has by construction a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one.  
Next, we analyze the predictive power of the recommendation change for the four individual 
CFNAI components. (1) Production and Income (PI) contributes about 33%, (2) Employment, 
Unemployment, and Hours (EUH) 32%, (3) Personal Consumption and Housing (CH) 14%, 
and (4) Sales, Orders and Inventories (SOI) 21% to the CFNAI.40 We use the same control 
variables as for the analysis of the whole CFNAI. The results are reported in Table 4.3. 
                                                     
40
 The weights are readjusted monthly. The shifts in weights are rather small, see Federal Reserve Bank of 
Chicago (2012b). 
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Table 4.3 CFNAI Components Development and Changing Company Outlooks 
This table reports results from the following model: 
, 1
2
_ , 1,..., ,+
=
∆ = + ⋅∆ + ⋅ + ∀ =∑
N
n
t t t n t t
n
CFNAI COMPONENT rec control variable Tτ α β β ε τ
where the “Control Model” β for the respective CFNAI Components Production and Income 
(PI), Employment, Unemployment and Hours (EUH), Personal Consumption and Housing 
(CH), and Sales, Orders, and Inventories (SOI) is estimated with control for changes in the 
leading economic indicator ( lei∆ ), market excess returns (mex), dividend yield (divy), 
default spread (defs), term spread (tes), 3-month t-bill rate (3mtb), and three lags of the 
dependent variable. Inference is based on Newey-West Standard Errors. *, **, *** indicates 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
Control Model Control Model Control Model Control Model 
 
PI EUH CH  SOI 
Horizon 
1β  1β  1β  1β  
1 1.084** 0.121 0.118* -0.0118 
2 1.814*** 0.341 0.121 0.0841 
3 2.063*** 0.967** 0.179 0.1255 
4 1.112* 0.911** 0.102 0.228** 
5 1.034 1.197** 0.222 0.1541 
6 1.533** 1.051** 0.202 0.237** 
7 2.142*** 1.099*** 0.239 0.202* 
8 1.349** 1.055* 0.153 0.218* 
9 1.083 0.950* 0.201 0.261** 
10 0.864 1.209** 0.215 0.248** 
11 1.499** 1.220** 0.177 0.260** 
12 0.918 1.280** 0.114 0.157 
The results show that the predictive power of the recommendation change varies drastically 
for the four CFNAI components. The size of the coefficients is directly comparable. We find 
moderate predictive power for PI and EUH, relatively low predictive power for the SOI 
component, and no predictive power for CH. These results correspond to the weights of the 
individual series in the CFNAI and therefore to the relative importance for economic activity. 
Changes in company outlooks have less predictive power for individual measures of 
economic activity than for the CFNAI as an aggregate measure of economic activity. 
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To further evaluate the properties of aggregated company outlooks we restrict the sample to 
firms listed on the S&P 500. We again perform the previous analysis, however, the 
aggregated recommendation change is calculated only for S&P 500 firms. Using only 
outlooks of a part of the entire economy the number of observed companies decreases and 
consequently the number of issued stock recommendations also declines to an average of 552 
recommendations per months compared to 2,575 recommendations in the base case where the 
entire economy is considered. The results are shown in Table 4.4. 
Table 4.4 CFNAI Development and Changing Company Outlooks S&P 500 only 
This table reports results from the following model: 
 
N
S P n
t t t n t t
n
CFNAI rec control variable T& 500, 1
2
, 1, ..., ,τ α β β ε τ+
=
∆ = + ⋅ ∆ + ⋅ + ∀ =∑  
where the “Base Model” β is estimated without control variables and the “Control Model” β 
is estimated with control for changes in the leading economic indicator ( lei∆ ), market 
excess returns (mex), dividend yield (divy), default spread (defs), term spread (tes), 3-month 
t-bill rate (3mtb), and three lags of the dependent variable. Only S&P 500 firms are 
considered in the consensus recommendation calculation. Inference is based on Newey-West 
Standard Errors. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
Base Model Control Model 
Horizon  
1β  
 
1β  
1 1.655** 1.755** 
2 1.709** 2.177** 
3 1.4535 2.430** 
4 1.2018 2.313** 
5 1.695* 2.774** 
6 1.914* 2.963** 
7 1.9161 3.151** 
8 0.8962 2.342* 
9 0.6508 1.9422 
10 1.4107 2.713** 
11 0.4665 2.764** 
12   0.9074   2.727** 
The results point out that our general results are somewhat weaker when using only the firms 
listed on the S&P 500. The aggregated recommendation change predicts economic activity up 
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to 11 months (“Control Model”).41 The coefficient is smaller for 8 out of 12 months. The 
results indicate that using outputs from a larger sample leads to more predictive power than 
using only outlooks of companies listed in the S&P 500. However, since the largest publicly 
traded companies are included in the S&P 500 the economic difference is rather small.  
Overall, our results show that aggregated company outlooks proxied by aggregated stock 
recommendations are an important macroeconomic predictor. The information set included in 
the aggregated company outlooks is not reflected in other established macroeconomic 
variables making it a valuable predictor for macroeconomic developments. 
Next, we analyze aggregated company outlooks proxied by aggregated earnings forecasts as 
an alternative measure for company outlooks. Each month we calculate the median earnings 
per share forecast based on earnings forecasts issued in the respective month. In order to 
control for different forecast horizons we calculate the median earnings per share forecast 
separately for forecasts with a forecast horizon of less or equal to 3 months, less or equal to 6 
months, less or equal to 12 months and greater than 12 months. Since earnings per share 
forecasts show seasonal patterns we calculate the monthly change in the earnings forecasts 
relatively to the aggregate median earnings forecast twelve months ago. Finally, we apply the 
Baxter-King filter42 with a minimum period of oscillation of 18 and a maximum oscillation 
period of 96 corresponding to monthly date. The calculation of the monthly change in 
aggregated earnings per share forecasts is shown below: 
 
, 12,
12,
_ _
_
t Horizon t Horizon
t
t Horizon
Median EPS Median EPS
EPS
Median EPS
−
−
−
∆ =  (4.4) 
                                                     
41
 Results for the 12-month horizon should be handled with care due to non-stationarity issues according to the 
Phillips–Perron test. 
42
 Baxter and King (1999). 
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Estimation results are shown in Table 4.5: 
Table 4.5 CFNAI Developments and Changing Median Earnings Forecasts 
This table reports results from the following model: 
, 1
2
, 1,..., ,+
=
∆ = + ⋅∆ + ⋅ + ∀ =∑
N
n
t t t n t t
n
CFNAI EPS control variable Tτ α β β ε τ  
where the “Control Model” β is estimated with the respective EPS change (horizon is equal to 
3 months, 6 months, 12 months and above 12 months) and controlling for changes in the 
leading economic indicator ( lei∆ ), market excess returns (mex), dividend yield (divy), 
default spread (defs), term spread (tes), 3-month t-bill rate (3mtb), and three lags of the 
dependent variable. Inference is based on Newey-West Standard Errors. *, **, *** indicates 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
Control Model Control Model Control Model Control Model 
 
EPS 3 months EPS 6 months EPS 12 
months 
EPS > 12 months 
Horizon 
1β  1β  1β  1β  
1 0.0004 -0.0002 0.0003 0.0007 
2 0.0034 -0.0001 -0.0002 0.0000 
3 0.0054 0.0003 -0.0005 -0.0003 
4 0.0040 0.0003 -0.0005 -0.0002 
5 -0.0008 0.0004 -0.0007 -0.0006 
6 0.0001 0.0002 -0.0028 -0.0008 
7 -0.0044 0.0008 -0.0031 -0.0015 
8 0.0024 0.0005 -0.0028 -0.0007 
9 -0.0019 0.0006 -0.0003 -0.0014 
10 -0.0006 -0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0012 
11 -0.0048 -0.0002 0.0001 -0.0027 
12 0.0018 -0.0010 0.0011 -0.0031 
We do not find any predictive power for the CFNAI in companies’ aggregated earnings per 
share forecasts. This result is in line with the disadvantages of earnings forecasts discussed in 
Section 4.2. Most prominently, recommendations contain a larger information set than just an 
one period earnings forecasts. They basically include earnings forecasts for several years as 
well as interest rate assumptions and risk premium forecasts. Additionally, earnings forecasts 
might be based on stale information. Consequently, our results lend support to the notion that 
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more forward-looking information, as included in recommendation changes, is required if one 
attempts to forecast future macroeconomic developments. 
4.5 Conclusion 
Combining individual company outlooks and macroeconomic developments is a new 
approach to exploit publicly available, but neglected, information. Our results show that the 
aggregation of these outlooks has predictive power for future macroeconomic developments 
of about one year. Due to their strong performance, changing company outlooks might be a 
promising predictor for different applications, especially in the area of now-casting and mid-
term forecasting, e.g., for economic agencies. As shown, our measure contains information 
content not inherent in well-established macroeconomic predictors. Therefore it seems 
mandatory to use company outlooks as a control variable in models which could be 
influenced by macroeconomic developments. 
Our results also provide a potential explanation for the old Wall Street saying that the stock 
market leads the economy. Recommendation changes basically mirror expectation changes of 
well informed market participants. We document that these changes lead overall 
macroeconomic conditions. Assuming that the stock market incorporates these new 
expectations, the overall stock market must lead the real economy. Thus far there is no study 
showing this direct link.  
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Appendix to Chapter 2 
Appendix 2 A 
The direct estimation of   
 ( )tt t t hF E A I A1τ τλ λ− − = ⋅ + − ⋅   (A.1) 
is not possible. However the estimation becomes feasible by means of the well known 
definition of the unanticipated news component of a macroeconomic release: 
 
t t tS A F= − , (A.2) 
where 
tS denotes the unanticipated news component called surprise, tA  the actual announced 
value of the macroeconomic indicator and 
tF  the survey based forecast. Taking the 
conditional expectation of Equation (A.2) and rearranging it leads to: 
 .tt t t t tE A I E S I Fτ τ τ− − −   = +     (A.3) 
Substituting t tE A I τ−   in (A.1) with (A.3) gives the model for the further investigation: 
 
t
t t t hE S I F A
1 1
τ τ
λ λ
λ λ
− −
− −  = ⋅ − ⋅  . (A.4) 
For reasons of clarity we define the slope coefficient in our model as: 
 
( )1 λ
γ
λ
−
≡ .  (A.5) 
Therefore the regression model for the test of the anchoring bias is given by43: 
 ( )t t thS F Aγ η= ⋅ − + . (A.6) 
 
                                                     
43
 Although Equation (A.6) does not include a constant we always include one in the estimation. 
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Appendix 2 B 
Assume that 
tA  follows an ARIMA(p,d,q) process without a constant term, or equivalently, 
the first difference of 
tA  follows an ARMA(p,q) process:  
1 1 2 2
1 1 2 2
...
        ... ,
t t t p t p
t t t q t q
A b A b A b A
c c cε ε ε ε
− − −
− − −
∆ = ⋅∆ + ⋅∆ + + ⋅∆
+ + ⋅ + ⋅ + + ⋅
 
with i.i.d. ( )2~ 0,t Nε σ . At this point we maximally consider the first difference (d=1) 
because all integrated macroeconomic series are stationary after differencing once. Provided 
the process is stationary, it can be rewritten as:  
2
1 2
2
1 2
1 ...
( )     with ( ) .
1 ...
q
q
t t p
p
c L c L c L
A L L
b L b L b L
ψ ε ψ
+ ⋅ + ⋅ + + ⋅
∆ = =
− ⋅ − ⋅ − − ⋅
 
For example, for an ARIMA(1,1,1) or equivalently for an ARMA(1,1) of a differenced series 
we then get:  
1
1 1 1
1
                   with .j jt t j t j j
j
A b c bε β ε β
∞
−
−
=
∆ = + ⋅ = ⋅ +∑  
Moreover suppose that analysts use a corresponding ARIMA(p,d,q) model to generate 
forecasts. However, suppose that analysts can obtain some additional information 
tZ
 
useful 
to predict the innovation εt
 
in 
tA , e.g., from the inspection of other macroeconomic 
announcements released earlier. Assume that ( , ) 0t tcorr Zε ≠  and 
( , ) 0 1t j tcorr Z jε − = ∀ ≥ . Then their forecasts may be written as: 
1
1
ˆ .t t j t j t
j
F A Zβ ε
∞
− −
=
= + ⋅ +∑
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Substituting the above MA(∞) representations of 
tA  and tF  into the anchoring regression:  
1
1
h
t t t t i t
i
A F F A
h
γ η−
=
  − = ⋅ − +   
∑  
yields  
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1 1
ˆ
1ˆ
t t j t j t j t j t
j j
h
t j t j t t i t i j t j i t
j i j
A A Z
A Z A
h
ε β ε β ε
γ β ε ε β ε η
∞ ∞
− − − −
= =
∞ ∞
− − − − − − −
= = =
       + + − + ⋅ +         
       = ⋅ + ⋅ + − + + ⋅ +         
∑ ∑
∑ ∑ ∑
 
and after simplifying 
( )
1
1 1
1 1 1
ˆ
1ˆ .
t j j t j t
j
h
t j t j t t i t i j t j i t
j i j
Z
A Z A
h
ε β β ε
γ β ε ε β ε η
∞
−
=
∞ ∞
− − − − − − −
= = =
  + − ⋅ −   
       = ⋅ + ⋅ + − + + ⋅ +        
∑
∑ ∑ ∑
 
Now we can rewrite the anchoring bias regression as:  
( )' '1 1ˆt t t t t ty Z x Z
y xt t
γε η− −+ − = ⋅ + + 
 
with ( )' 1
1
ˆ
t j j t j
j
y β β ε
∞
− −
=
≡ − ⋅∑
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and44 
'
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1 1
1ˆ
1ˆ
h
t t j t j t i t i j t j i
j i j
h h i
j t j t j k t j k
j i j k
x A A
h
h
β ε ε β ε
β ε ε β ε
∞ ∞
− − − − − − − −
= = =
∞ − ∞
− − − −
= = = =
  ≡ + ⋅ − + + ⋅    
  = ⋅ + + ⋅    
∑ ∑ ∑
∑ ∑∑ ∑
. 
Note that ' 1ty − and 
'
1tx −
 
collect past time series information, or more precisely, terms 
depending on past innovations εt
 
and (true and estimated) time series parameters ˆ( jβ and 
)jβ . In contrast, εt
 
captures the innovations of the announcement process, i.e., the component 
of an announcement which is unpredictable on the basis of past time series information. tZ is 
similar to an innovation since it cannot be explained by past announcements. Hence, tZ
reflects deviations of analysts’ forecasts from purely time series based forecasts, or the 
influence of “additional information” (besides past announcements) on analyst’ forecasts.  
 
                                                     
44
 Note that '
1tx −  is stationary. With 
1
t i t i j t j i
j
A ε β ε
∞
− − − −
=
∆ = + ⋅∑  we can rewrite 
       
'
1 1 1
1 1 1
1ˆ     
h
t t j t j t i t i j t j i
j i j
x A A
h
β ε ε β ε
∞ ∞
− − − − − − − −
= = =
  ≡ + ⋅ − + + ⋅    
∑ ∑ ∑
 
to
 
 
      
( )
( )
'
1 1 1
1 1
1
1 1
1
1 1
1 1 1
1
1ˆ     
1ˆ          
1ˆ          
1ˆ          
ˆ          
h
t t j t j t i t i
j i
h
t j t j t i
j i
h
j t j t t i
j i
h h i
j t j t j
j i j
j t j
j
x A A A
h
A A
h
A A
h
A
h
β ε
β ε
β ε
β ε
β ε
∞
− − − − − −
= =
∞
− − −
= =
∞
− − −
= =
∞ −
− −
= = =
∞
−
=
= + ⋅ − + ∆
= + ⋅ −
= ⋅ + −
= ⋅ + ∆
= ⋅ +
∑ ∑
∑ ∑
∑ ∑
∑ ∑∑
∑
1 1 1
1
h h i
t j k t j k
i j kh
ε β ε
− ∞
− − −
= = =
   + ⋅    
∑∑ ∑
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The coefficient γˆ of the anchoring regression is given by: 
( )
( )
( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
' '
1 1
'
1
' '
1 1
'
1
,
ˆ
,
, ,
,
t t
t
t t t t t
t t
t t t t t
t t
Cov x y
Var x
Cov y Z x Z
Var x Z
Cov y x Cov Z Var Z
Var x Var Z
γ
ε
ε
− −
−
− −
−
=
+ − +
=
+
+ −
=
+
 
where the last line exploits the fact that ( )' 1, 0t tCov Z y − = , ( )t tCov Z x ' 1, 0− = ,
 
and 
( )t tCov x ' 1, 0ε − =  by construction. We can split this expression into two parts by collecting 
all terms in the numerator depending on ' 1tx −  and those depending on tZ : 
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
' '
1 1
1 '
1
2 '
1
,
ˆ
,
ˆ .
t t
t t
t t t
t t
Cov y x
Var x Var Z
Cov Z Var Z
Var x Var Z
γ
ε
γ
− −
−
−
=
+
−
=
+
 
The first component 1γˆ
 
captures the influence of (possibly biased) parameters ˆ
jβ , while the 
second component 2γˆ  captures the influence of .tZ In the case of non-integrated time series, 
i.e., if 
tA follows an ARMA(p,q) process only the definition of ' 1ty − and ' 1tx − changes to: 
( )' 1
1
ˆ
t j j t j
j
y β β ε
∞
− −
=
≡ − ⋅∑  
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and 
'
1
1 1 1
1ˆ .
h
t j t j t i j t j i
j i j
x
h
β ε ε β ε
∞ ∞
− − − − −
= = =
  ≡ ⋅ − + ⋅    
∑ ∑ ∑  
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Appendix 2 C 
Technically, our simulation procedure consists of the following steps: 
(1) We start by simulating time series for a macroeconomic release tAɶ  using 
ARIMA(1,0,0), ARIMA(1,0,1) and ARIMA(1,1,1) models. For brevity, we describe 
only how we generate ARIMA(1,0,1) processes, i.e., 
1 1t t t tA Aα β ε ε− −= ⋅ + ⋅ +
ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶ . In 
addition, we also simulate a process for 
tZ
ɶ , assuming that 
tZ
ɶ
 (as well as 
tεɶ ) is just a 
series of normally distributed random variables. While both 
tZ
ɶ
 and 
tεɶ
 
are not 
autocorrelated, we allow for a contemporaneous correlation among them, i.e., for 
different values of ρ = ( )corr ,t tZ εɶ ɶ . Within each simulation run we produce a time 
series of 2,000 observations for 
tZ
ɶ
 and tAɶ  (after a spin-in period of 2,000 
observations). 
(2) Then we perform two rolling estimations (using a rolling estimation window of 1,000 
observations) to generate two series (each with n = 1,000) of one-step-ahead out-of-
sample predictions: First, we produce a time series of “simple” one-step-ahead 
forecasts estimating a rolling ARIMA(1,0,1) model,45 i.e., 
1 1t t t tA Aα β ε ε− −= ⋅ + ⋅ +
ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶ . Second, we generate a series of “sophisticated” one-
step-ahead forecasts based on a rolling ARIMAX estimation, i.e., 
1 1t t t t tA A Zα β ε φ ε− −= ⋅ + ⋅ + +
ɶ ɶ ɶɶ ɶ . 
(3) On these two out-of-sample forecast series (n = 1,000) we then perform anchoring 
tests for h
 
= 1, 2 and 3. We retain the test results for the optimal h , i.e., for which 
the anchoring regression performed best according to the BIC. 
                                                     
45
 For the other specifications as mentioned in step (1) we estimate the corresponding ARIMA model. 
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Steps (1) to (3) are repeated 5,000 times for different parameter combinations, i.e., for α = 0.2, 
0.4, 0.6, and 0.8, β = 0.2, and ρ = 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, and 0.8.   
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Appendix to Chapter 3 
Appendix 3 A 
Table Appendix 3 A Summary Statistics for Predictability Quartiles 
Panel A to D report summary statistics for the set of used variables in descending 
predictability order. AFErr denotes the scaled absolute forecast error, L.AFErr the absolute 
forecast error from the previous period, SpExp specific experience, GenExp general 
experience, GAbil the general ability measure, CovInd the number of covered indicators, and 
Horizon the forecast horizon. 
Panel A: First Predictability Quartile (Highest Predictability) 
  AFErr L.AFErr SpExp GenExp GAbil CovInd Horizon 
Mean 1.49 1.39 43.49 55.95 0.61 18.58 8.73 
Median 1.32 1.25 34.00 49.00 0.62 20.00 5.00 
10th Percentile 0.00 0.00 5.00 8.00 0.50 12.00 1.00 
90th Percentile 3.10 2.93 97.00 118.00 0.72 22.00 10.00 
Panel B: Second Predictability Quartile 
  AFErr L.AFErr SpExp GenExp GAbil CovInd Horizon 
Mean 1.86 1.63 42.71 57.10 0.62 18.61 7.33 
Median 1.58 1.40 34.00 50.00 0.62 20.00 5.00 
10th Percentile 0.00 0.00 5.00 9.00 0.50 13.00 1.00 
90th Percentile 3.77 3.33 94.00 118.00 0.72 22.00 10.00 
Panel C: Third Predictability Quartile 
  AFErr L.AFErr SpExp GenExp GAbil CovInd Horizon 
Mean 2.01 1.70 44.30 55.47 0.61 18.27 8.07 
Median 1.88 1.69 35.00 48.00 0.62 19.00 6.00 
10th Percentile 0.00 0.00 5.00 8.00 0.49 12.00 2.00 
90th Percentile 4.12 3.46 98.00 117.00 0.72 22.00 11.00 
Panel D: Fourth Predictability Quartile (Lowest Predictability) 
  AFErr L.AFErr SpExp GenExp GAbil CovInd Horizon 
Mean 2.43 2.01 43.83 55.54 0.62 18.07 5.37 
Median 2.11 1.83 35.00 48.00 0.63 20.00 4.00 
10th Percentile 0.43 0.34 5.00 9.00 0.50 12.00 1.00 
90th Percentile 4.80 3.88 98.00 117.00 0.73 22.00 11.00 
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Appendix to Chapter 4 
Appendix 4 A: Stationarity Tests of the CFNAI Change and its 
Components 
Table Appendix 4 A Stationarity Tests of the CFNAI Change and its Components 
This table reports Phillips-Perron
 testτ − statistics using the corresponding MacKinnon 
approximated p-values for the forward looking CFNAI change (CFNAI F), historical CFNAI 
changes (CFNAI H), and the changes of the respective CFNAI components Production and 
Income (PI), Employment, Unemployment, and Hours (EUH), Personal Consumption and 
Housing (CH), and Sales, Orders, and Inventories (SOI). *, **, *** indicates significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
Horizon CFNAI F CFNAI H CFNAI PI CFNAI EUH CFNAI CH CFNAI SOI 
1 -12.601*** -12.601*** -13.499*** -11.267*** -10.983*** -16.450*** 
2 -6.178*** -6.178*** -7.146*** -5.325*** -5.618*** -7.614*** 
3 -5.922*** -5.922*** -6.921*** -5.586*** -5.535*** -7.785*** 
4 -4.786*** -4.786*** -5.282*** -4.736*** -4.684*** -6.454*** 
5 -4.597*** -4.597*** -5.227*** -4.620*** -4.450*** -5.760*** 
6 -4.266*** -4.266*** -5.047*** -4.195*** -4.084*** -5.953*** 
7 -3.948*** -3.948*** -4.611*** -3.952*** -3.711*** -5.167*** 
8 -3.447*** -3.447*** -4.247*** -3.662*** -3.411** -4.934*** 
9 -3.044** -3.044** -4.022*** -3.512*** -3.134** -4.677*** 
10 -2.663* -2.663* -4.044*** -3.379** -2.904*** -4.320*** 
11 -2.633* -2.633* -3.882*** -3.240** -2.648* -4.488*** 
12 -2.205 -2.205 -3.828*** -3.146** -2.477 -4.074*** 
  
Appendix 4 B: Correlation Matrix 
Table Appendix 4 B Correlation Matrix 
This table reports the correlations coefficients between the 12 forward looking CFNAI changes (CFNAI1 to CFNAI12), the recommendation change (∆rec), the 
change in the leading economic indicator (∆lei), market excess returns (mex), dividend yield (divy), default spread (defs), term spread (tes), and the 3-month T-Bill 
rate (3mtb). 
 CFNAI 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 ∆rec ∆lei mex divy defs 3mtb tes 
CFNAI1 1.00                                     
CFNAI2 0.72 1.00 
CFNAI3 0.65 0.85 1.00 
CFNAI4 0.45 0.72 0.88 1.00 
CFNAI5 0.44 0.59 0.78 0.91 1.00 
CFNAI6 0.39 0.55 0.67 0.83 0.93 1.00 
CFNAI7 0.35 0.50 0.63 0.73 0.86 0.94 1.00 
CFNAI8 0.27 0.43 0.56 0.68 0.77 0.87 0.94 1.00 
CFNAI9 0.23 0.34 0.49 0.60 0.71 0.79 0.89 0.95 1.00 
CFNAI10 0.22 0.31 0.42 0.54 0.65 0.74 0.81 0.90 0.95 1.00 
CFNAI11 0.20 0.29 0.39 0.48 0.59 0.69 0.77 0.83 0.91 0.96 1.00 
CFNAI12 0.19 0.28 0.37 0.45 0.54 0.64 0.72 0.79 0.85 0.92 0.96 1.00 
∆rec 0.22 0.20 0.13 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.04 1.00 
∆lei 0.32 0.48 0.34 0.31 0.22 0.23 0.21 0.19 0.14 0.12 0.08 0.08 0.08 1.00 
mex 0.16 0.23 0.34 0.30 0.21 0.12 0.10 0.10 0.05 0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.12 0.28 1.00 
divy -0.08 -0.10 -0.07 -0.01 0.06 0.11 0.14 0.17 0.20 0.22 0.24 0.26 0.01 -0.15 -0.08 1.00 
defs -0.08 -0.07 -0.01 0.07 0.15 0.22 0.26 0.31 0.36 0.41 0.44 0.47 -0.08 -0.20 -0.27 0.17 1.00 
3mtb -0.04 -0.07 -0.10 -0.14 -0.17 -0.20 -0.22 -0.25 -0.27 -0.29 -0.31 -0.33 0.03 -0.09 0.13 -0.15 -0.68 1.00 
tes 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.12 0.13 0.15 0.18 0.20 0.21 0.22 0.25 -0.01 0.25 -0.08 0.31 0.39 -0.76 1.00 
 
